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ABSTRACT PAGE
Food is one of the elem ental n eed s of the human race. The importance of such an a sse t is 
difficult to overestim ate. The availability of inexpensive, nutritious, and plentiful food and 
fiber benefits the econom ic, social, and security concerns o f a nation. Am erica  benefits 
from industrious efforts and fertile lands to produce a bounty of food and fiber that in no 
small part has aided its ascension  to world power.
During the cold war, America’s  agricultural bounty becam e a symbol of power, prestige, 
and bounty that served as a psychological weapon against the Soviet Union. As a result, 
the American farmer w as elevated beyond a mere producer of su sten an ce to an active 
cold war participant. The ramifications of agriculture’s  role in the cold war have lasted for 
d eca d es in the form of subsidies, surpluses, and a lasting welfare system  for farmers and 
agricultural interests.
This thesis explores how the United States, through the u se of such programs as Public 
Law 480, sought to exploit its agricultural production during the 1950s. The Eisenhower 
administration, seeking to make u se of le ss  expensive alternatives in its containment 
policies, saw  a m eans of reducing surplus foodstuffs and financial costs while also  
offsetting possible Soviet aggression. By analyzing foreign policy docum ents, agricultural 
policy and trade publications, and surveying the view s of those farming at that time, details 
of the cold war era's lasting legacy on agriculture are readily apparent.
Principally, the cold war fostered apathy on the part of C ongress and the Administration as  
they passed  agricultural policies that promoted surplus production. Likewise, farmers, 
buoyed by technological and methodological advances that further fueled production, were 
not motivated to participate in surplus-curbing programs. The fear of communist 
aggression  suspended  efforts to address the surplus issue in any meaningful way. In the 
end, the cold war furthered the agricultural sector's d ependence on governm ent subsidies, 
creating a welfare culture and moving food and fiber production into an increasingly 
militaristic role.
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Prologue
1
The cold war changed America. From the highest rungs of government to 
large and small businesses to television and literature, the cold war pervaded 
American life. The repercussions of the cold war still linger within the conduct of 
U.S. foreign policy, the globalization of our economy, and even the groceries in our 
supermarket. An oft overlooked aspect of the cold war’s impression on American 
society and economy is the transformation of American agriculture.
To this day, agriculture bears the scars of cold war foreign policy on the 
policies and principles set down by the federal government. Specifically, the cold war 
lent the fear and insecurity necessary to propagate policies that extended and expanded 
the agricultural sector’s dependence on subsidy and supports. The great strength and 
vitality of American agriculture during the cold war only furthered the need to 
maintain that great strategic and psychological edge in the ideological battle with 
communism.]
The Eisenhower administration simultaneously faced the heightening tensions 
of the cold war as well as a burgeoning surplus in American agriculture. These two 
disparate challenges became intertwined in the 1950s as the Eisenhower 
administration sought to manage foreign and agricultural policy. Yet, as the cold war 
forced the United States into preparations for a possible militaristic conflict, these
'B ruce  F. Johnston, “Farm Surpluses and Foreign Policy,” World Politics, Vol. 10, Issue 1 (Oct., 1957), 11. Also, 
Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Food fo r  W ar-Foodfor Peace: United States Food A id  in a Global Context (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England, The MIT Press, 1980), 7-8 & 21-22. For administration comment on 
agricultural superiority see FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1958-1960, IV, 173-174. “Minutes o f the 76lh 
Meeting o f the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, July 8, 1958.”
2much maligned surpluses became strategic assets. The Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480) allowed the Eisenhower 
administration to use surplus goods as developmental aid, trade leverage, and 
incentive for loyalty to the United States. The result was a marriage of agricultural 
surplus to cold war foreign policy that indelibly marked the U.S. farm sector.
This policy had unintended consequences. By attempting to navigate a 
minefield of conflicting interests, agricultural policy makers ignored the purely 
economic considerations of supply and demand. Subsidization of agriculture, which 
was meant to alleviate farm income concerns, spurred production. Dramatic 
technological advances in machinery, chemicals, hybrids, and technique added even 
more to impressive production increases. Domestically, these surpluses were scorned 
for their economic costs to the U.S. taxpayer. However, the surpluses also 
demonstrated American supremacy in the field of agriculture. As a result, the 
Eisenhower administration was faced with choosing between designing a sound 
agricultural policy or using surpluses as a tool of foreign policy.
Similarly, American farmers -  faced with the broad societal apprehension of 
the cold war — confronted challenging problems in the operation of their farms. 
Competition, increasing costs, and flat prices fed an atmosphere that favored large 
farms over small farms and overproduction in the face of a burgeoning surplus. These 
contradictions and pressures were not fueled entirely by the cold war. Instead, the 
cold war’s omnipresent existence in American society, economy, and policy lent 
considerable impetus to the maintenance of a welfare system for farmers. This
3welfare system constructed a security net for the farm sector as well as a strategic 
foodstuff stockpile — a none-too-small advantage in any possible World War III 
scenario.
The voice of American cold war era farmers often has been neglected in 
considerations of American cold war foreign and agricultural policy. A limited 
number of snapshots from magazines, newspapers, and other media offer an 
incomplete understanding of the thoughts and feelings of the American farmer. Few 
of these records delve into any detail, nor do they contain numerous individual 
responses. In order to fill this gap in the narrative of the cold war and agriculture, this 
study conducted a survey aimed at garnering a broader glimpse of farmers’ views of 
this tense time in American history.
The survey was unabashedly limited in scope. The survey was aimed at a 
specific geographic region and at farmers or agribusiness members who experienced 
the 1950s and 1960s. Today this region is solidly part of the com-soybean belt of 
American agriculture -  crops that grew in importance during the second half of the 
20th century. These two crops also are among the most historically subsidized crops 
and remain so today.4 At present, com and soybeans are used for goods and products 
far beyond simple food and feedstuffs of the past. The list of applications for these 
crops includes, but is not limited to, the following: fuel oil-substitutes (ethanol and
2 Agribusiness members include farm cooperative and grain elevator manager and rural farm business operators.
3 Stretching from Ohio westward to Nebraska, this region includes Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Missouri, Kansas, and Michigan.
4 U.S. General Accounting Office, Farm Programs: Information on Recipients o f  Federal Payments, (Washington, 
D.C., 2001) 22. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Farm Income Data. Based on 
calculations o f direct farm payments and principle crops. Com in particular has been and remains heavily 
subsidized.
soy-biodiesel), processed sugar and oil extracts (com syrups and soybean oils), and 
industrial chemicals and goods (degradable plastics, inks, and adhesives). These two 
crops have grown to dominate planted acres in the regions surveyed. As such, these 
farmers are intimately familiar with farm subsidies and the agricultural policies that 
have created them.
Com 2004 
Planted Aero* by County
S C M t t *
100X00 >«N*
USDA
Soybeans 2004 
Planted Acres by County
Corn and Soybean  P l a n t e d  A c r e s  b y  C ou n ty  2 0 04 ,  USDA, NASS.5
The survey, which consisted of thirty-three multiple choice and short answer 
questions, was constructed in a manner to help clarify and enlighten certain aspects of 
agricultural policy. Additionally, farmers’ impressions of foreign policy, and the cold 
war more generally, were queried in an attempt to capture insights into those areas. 
The results of the survey included both quantifiable responses and interpretive 
answers. As such, textual replies were reviewed and analyzed to provide contextual 
background and perception. Quantifiable responses were evaluated via computations 
and simple analyses via a Microsoft Access database and several Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets.
5 U.S. Department o f Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, 
http://www.nass.usda.gov/Charts_and_Maps/Crops_County/cr-pl.asp.
5The scientific nature of the survey certainly was not sophisticated; rather, it 
was an effort to provide a specific view on history, a limited oral history, that could be 
utilized to shed light on broader foreign policy topics. The results offer first-hand 
expertise, which is meant as an addendum or companion to the overarching study of 
foreign policy, cold war, and agriculture. The responses provide documentation of the 
complexity, confusion, and difficulty that permeated life in agriculture during this time 
period. In the end, the survey lends a voice to farmers and exemplifies the discord in 
agriculture that limited efforts to identify the cause of surplus and devise a solution.
The Soviet Union’s perceived power fueled domestic fears and led to the 
entrenchment of the containment policy. This heightening of the cold war during the 
1950s provided continued basis for federal intervention in agriculture. The disdain for 
agricultural surplus subsidization was tempered by cold war apprehension. One result 
was continued failure to address the growing contradictions within American 
agriculture involving labor input, production output, and price supports. Ultimately, 
this confluence of trepidation and inaction only further rooted American agriculture in 
subsidization.
The immense stockpiles of food and fiber, much like the military weaponry 
build-up, projected American strength. The psychological value of food, as well as its 
use as a development and aid tool, cemented agriculture’s role in the cold war 
standoff. The Eisenhower administration made use of this advantage through tools 
such as Public Law 480. Meanwhile, farmers were caught in a web of complex 
agricultural policy, technological innovation, and economic pressure. With no
organized effort to change the surplus situation, along with mounting cold war 
anxiety, American agriculture became ensconced in a system of surplus and subsidy.
7The Militarization of Agriculture 
Cold War, Foreign Aid, and the Expansion o f  the Am erican Agricultural 
Welfare System Under President Eisenhower
“Defense-supporting economic assistance is being 
furnished or is contemplated to carefully selected and 
strategically located free world countries in a wide arc 
which virtually surrounds the Soviet bloc. These 
countries are united with the U.S. in a common cause: to 
resist Communist penetration or domination of the free 
world. U.S. assistance is designed to help them achieve 
the economic strength which will, in the long run, enable 
them to maintain without further aid the forces which 
the U.S. believes to be required.” - Status of the Mutual 
Security Program as of June 30, 19551
The success of post-World War II assistance programs, such as the Marshall 
Plan, solidified the use of foreign aid as an invaluable aspect of U.S. foreign policy.
In subsequent years, aid became a method of not only providing assistance for the 
reconstruction or development of infrastructure suitable for free enterprise, but also a 
means of garnering influence in and the admiration of recipient nations. As the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and the world slipped deeper into the grasp of cold war, aid 
became a vital factor in supporting the cause of the “free world” within nations unable 
to bear that burden alone. Whether under the guise of humanitarian aid or
1 U.S. Department o f State, Foreign Relations o f  the United States [henceforth FRUS]: Foreign A id  and Economic 
Defense Policy 1955-1957, X (Washington D.C., 1992), 17. “Status o f the Mutual Security Program as of June 30, 
1955.” Details of United States foreign policy concerning agriculture, surpluses, and foreign aid are found within 
the Department o f State’s publication Foreign Relations o f  the Unites States (FRUS). The Department o f State 
website (http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/) describes the series as presenting “the official documentary historical 
record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity.” Further, “the series, which is 
produced by the State Department's Office o f the Historian, began in 1861 and now comprises more than 350 
individual volumes.” FRUS  proved to be an invaluable resource for locating documentation o f the Eisenhower 
administration’s policy and strategy discussions concerning the cold war and surpluses.
developmental assistance, foreign aid was a tool and weapon of foreign policy 
employed by the United States as leverage against the communist threat. In this role, 
foreign aid exploited American agricultural surplus with consequences still affecting 
agriculture today.
In the years immediately following World War II, the majority of aid was 
given toward reconstructing the infrastructures of Europe and Japan (see Figure 1.1). 
However, by the end of the Korean War in 1953, assistance programs instead 
supported the underdeveloped nations of the world -  not for reconstruction, but for 
development and creation of infrastructure. In the view of President Dwight 
Eisenhower’s administration, these underdeveloped nations faced “three main 
demands upon [their] resources:” their ability to defend themselves, their ability to 
sustain their “current consumption,” and their attempts to invest in their own 
development.3 This trio of demands was perceived to be more than an 
underdeveloped nation could sustain alone; hence, the Eisenhower administration felt 
it incumbent to provide the additional assistance necessary to meet these burdens.
2 U.S. Agency for International Development, Office o f Development Evaluation and Information, U.S. Overseas 
Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, <http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html>. The report is 
commonly known as The Greenbook. In the period 1946-1948, aid to Europe and Japan constituted 71.6%, and 
during the period 1949-1952, aid to Europe and Japan constituted 84.7%. By 1953-1961, aid there amounted to 
33.1%.
3 FRUS: Foreign A id  and Economic Defense Policy 1955-1957, X, 17. “Status of the Mutual Security Program as 
o f June 30, 1955, Definition and Scope of Defense-supporting Programs.”
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Program Name
Post-W ar
R e lie f
Period
1946-48
M arshall 
Plan Period  
1949-52
M utual 
Security  
A ct Period  
1953-61
Foreign  
A ssistan ce  
A ct Period  
1962-99
W orld  Total $12,963 $28,690 $43,330 $441,416
Western Europe $8,300 $23,078 $13,166 $35,286
Japan $980 $1,221 $1,188 $565
Sub-Total $9,279 $24,299 $14,355 $35,851
W estern  Europe & Japan 's
Percentage o f U.S. Total Aid 71.6% 84.7% 33.1% 8.1%
F i g u r e  1 . 1 :  U. S.  Wor ld  A i d ,  U. S.  A ge n cy  f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  D e v e lo p m e n t ,  O f f i c e  o f  
D ev e l o pm e n t  E v a l u a t i o n  and I n f o r m a t i o n , U. S.  O v e r s e a s  Loans and  G r a n t s ,  O b l i g a t i o n s  
and Loan A u t h o r i z a t i o n s . The r e p o r t  i s  commonly  known as  "The G r e e n b o o k ,"  
h t t p : / / q e s d b . u s a i d . g o v / g b k / i n d e x . h t m l .
Although U.S. aid was proclaimed as support for development in 
underdeveloped nations, it also was decidedly focused on curtailing communist 
expansion.4 U.S. aid packages were aimed at providing the economic and technical 
assistance needed by an underdeveloped nation in order to construct the infrastructure 
necessary for economic progress and self-sustenance. The United States hoped that 
aid would combat communism by presenting the freedoms, opportunities, and bounty 
of a democratic-capitalist system. In addition, aid was understood to be a form of 
binding, a “linkage,” which would gamer the receiving nation’s loyalty in exchange 
for U.S. protection.5 As aid programs grew increasingly into integral cold war assets,
4 FRUS: Foreign A id  and Economic Defense Policy 1955-1957, X, 17. According to notes: “U.S. security interests 
dictate that they [underdeveloped nations] make adequate provision for these needs [defense, current consumption, 
and investment], not only to sustain the necessary will, strength, and stability to face the Soviet threat and to 
provide constructive and attractive alternatives to Communism, but also, through economic development generally, 
to reduce the need for future U.S. assistance.”
5 W alter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1996, (New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 
1997), 267, 271. This term was more generally tied to Nixon era policies, in which political and economic issues 
were closely related. For example, if one wanted economic aid it was understood that political/military/diplomatic 
considerations would be given in return. This term is equally applicable to earlier administrations’ policies.
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the United States sought to utilize aid as a means of securing commitments of loyalty 
and spheres of interest around the world.
Within this context of U.S. foreign aid and the nation’s global anti-communist 
crusade, the American farmer increasingly became a part of U.S. cold war policy. 
Burgeoning agricultural surpluses and President Eisenhower’s fiscal ideology made 
aid packages involving agricultural goods an attractive alternative to dollar aid.6 As a 
result, American farmers became enmeshed in a policy of containment against 
communism in which their productive capacity was harnessed as a weapon of the cold 
war and as an agent of national security. Food and fiber production was used in 
various forms: directly as aid, as the basis for loans, as a lever in trade, as a tool of 
diplomatic negotiation, and -  importantly -  as a symbol of American hegemonic 
power. As such, farmers’ contribution to U.S. foreign policy had a dramatic and 
lasting impact on the world as well as on their own livelihoods.
Cold War, Hot Aid Battle
As relations deteriorated into what would become the cold war following 
World War II, the friction of two states with competing socio-political systems 
brought to the fore the importance of foreign aid as cold war leverage. The success of 
aid and assistance programs in Western Europe and Japan, particularly the non­
6 Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, A m erica’s Foreign Policy in a Changing World (New York: 
Harper Collins College Publishers, 1994), 233. Hartmann and Wendzel write that “U.S. national security spending 
was more than $50 billion (more than 13% of GNP)” and that Eisenhower saw “the Soviet threat as much 
economic as military.” Thus, aid packages utilizing non-dollar aid, such as agricultural surpluses, were attractive 
from a fiscal standpoint. This was a result o f Eisenhower’s belief that America’s economic health required a 
balanced budget, and thus, he advocated what was quickly labeled “the great equation” -  a balanced economic- 
military emphasis on strategic superiority with major force reductions” -  a fulfilling of the more “bang for the 
buck” conception.
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military nature of aid, set the stage for foreign aid’s prominence as a means of 
competition in the cold war without the risk of outright military conflict. Indeed, aid 
pitted the economic systems of the two combatants against one another in a proxy of 
their ideological struggle. The very success of early U.S. and Western aid programs 
inevitably led to the evolution of Soviet aid programs that emerged by the mid-1950s.
After the death of Stalin in 1953 and the maneuvers for leadership power that 
followed, the Soviet Union began to construct a foreign aid program of its own. By 
1955, the Eisenhower administration was concerned by the threat of Soviet aid. At 
National Security Council (NSC) meetings, the topic of Soviet aid was discussed as a 
“significant [development] affecting U.S. security.” Specifically, the NSC was 
concerned about Soviet offers of aid to “underdeveloped areas of the free world” that 
were less tied to military-security alliances. These aid packages were increasingly 
seen by some underdeveloped nations as better than U.S. gifts and loans for hard
n
currency because of the absence of such military linkage.
The Soviet initiative was a grave matter for the Eisenhower administration 
because the United States had held an advantage in aid programs in the decade 
following World War II. Not surprisingly, responses to the threat ranged widely. CIA 
Director Allen Dulles suggested developing a counter propaganda campaign, stating 
that “this aid constituted the first step which ultimately led to a Communist take-over,” 
while Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson added, “the Soviet program actually
7 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 28-30. “Memorandum o f Discussion at the 266th Meeting of the National 
Security Council, Washington, November 15, 1955.” The Soviet aid packages were in the form of low interest 
loans in return for local currencies and exports, a type o f aid package absent from the U.S. aid war chest.
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constituted a new form of colonialism.”8 Indeed, the NSC was alarmed by the Soviet 
aid program and feared the possibility that Soviet power might be strengthened by 
these expansionist tendencies. One area of concern, addressed by Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles, was the Soviet willingness to capitalize on local trade and 
economic issues. One example involved the Soviets absorbing Burmese surplus rice, 
an action the United States was unwilling to take since it already had a rice surplus.9
Further, the Secretary bemoaned that these countries were “enormously 
impressed” with the industrial progress the Soviet Union had made in a relatively short 
period of time. Beyond the Soviet aid program, the United States felt threatened by 
the positive perception the Soviet model of development was receiving from some 
areas of the world. At the January 18, 1956 NSC meeting, Secretary Dulles addressed 
the dramatic impression the Soviet Union’s rapid industrialization had had on the 
underdeveloped world. According to Dulles, the situation “challenged the industrial 
and political supremacy that up until now the West could maintain over the 
underdeveloped nations of the World.” The “Great American Experiment” had been 
surpassed by the 30-year-old “Great Russian Experiment.” Dulles believed that the 
U.S. aid program was dated and insufficient, and he direly prophesied that if the 
United States failed to solve this problem, “the Soviet Union would end up dominating 
all of Asia.” 10
8 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 30.
9 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 32-33.
10 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 32-33, 64. “Memorandum of Discussion at the 267th Meeting of the National
Security Council, Camp David, Maryland, November 21, 1955” and “Memorandum of Discussion at the 273rd
Meeting o f the National Security Council, Washington, January 18, 1956.”
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According to Dulles, the Soviets experimented with their own aid program 
because of the successful “free world . . . military formulas” that had forced them to 
move toward “less violent and militarily aggressive policies.”11 In essence, the very 
success of containment had pushed the Soviet Union to consider alternative methods 
of improving its strategic position around the globe. Despite believing that Soviet aid 
offers were superficial and insincere, President Eisenhower stated that the United 
States must balance military and economic aid and be ready to adjust to the situation 
as demanded by evolving Soviet policy.12
The appearance of a less hostile Soviet Union caused many problems for the 
Eisenhower administration’s foreign policy. Countries on the periphery of the Soviet 
bloc hoped to remain neutral, and U.S. aid packages that required them to “take sides” 
in order to qualify for aid offended them.13 Further, the perceived military linkage 
made the alternative Soviet programs, absent such linkage, more attractive. Some 
administration officials argued that if countries were allowed to remain neutral, the 
U.S. programs would be more “palatable psychologically.” Additionally, officials 
contended that “the Soviet bloc would lose a propaganda target in that future U.S. aid 
would be more positively slanted toward peace rather than preparation for war.” 
Further, if the United States advocated development over mutual security, the 
appearance of “linkage” between aid and military assistance would be reduced.14 
Such a policy change, however, met with opposition. Some members of the
11 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 32-33, 64.
12 Ibid., 53-54.
13 Ibid., 103. “Memorandum From the Chief o f the International Branch, Bureau o f the Budget (MACY), to the 
Director of the Bureau (Brundage), Washington, September 4, 1956.” No specific countries are stated.
14 Ibid., 103.
14
administration and Congress wished to restrict aid to only those willing to stand with 
the United States against communism.15
Despite the perceived threat of a focused Soviet aid program, the Soviet policy 
shift validated the success of previous U.S. aid endeavors. Indeed, the use of foreign 
aid to underdeveloped nations fit perfectly into President Eisenhower’s formulation of 
a New Look foreign policy. This policy was meant to obtain “more bang for the 
buck.” 16 It was founded on a “massive retaliation” philosophy leveraging nuclear 
might as an offset to a large, costly, standing army. Eisenhower’s paramount concerns 
regarding foreign policy were to deter a Soviet first atomic attack and to hinder 
expansion of the Soviet bloc. Further, the policy supported efforts aimed to 
destabilize and fragment the Soviet bloc, hopefully leading to the bloc’s eventual
17break-up.
Within the Eisenhower administration’s New Look formulation, foreign 
economic aid was a crucial element. In fact, Secretary Dulles believed “the problem 
of foreign aid was far and away the most important single aspect of our foreign 
policy.”18 Dulles’s view echoed sentiments of the President, who once expressed the 
view that foreign aid was “the cheapest insurance in the world.” 19 According to 
Dulles, the United States was trying to place the Soviet rulers into a position in which
15 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X , 103.
16 LaFeber, America, 154.
17 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 118-123. “Memorandum of Discussion Between the President’s Citizen 
Advisers on the Mutual Security Program and the Secretary o f State, Washington, October 25, 1956.”
18 Ibid., 118.
19 Ibid., 34. “Memorandum o f Discussion at the 267th Meeting of the National Security Council, Camp David, 
Maryland, November 21,1955.”
15
they must “concentrate on their own problems.” 20 “Our so-called foreign aid 
program,” he said, “which is really not foreign aid because it isn’t aid to foreigners but
9 1aid to us, is an indispensable factor in carrying out our foreign policy.” In order to 
measure the effectiveness of aid spent, Dulles argued that one must consider the only 
alternative: communist domination.22
Despite their regard for foreign aid, Eisenhower and Dulles also recognized 
aid’s expensive nature. Eisenhower, in particular, was strident in his desire to 
maintain “fiscal morality” in aid policy.23 In particular, dollar aid denoted for military 
purposes increasingly was seen by the administration as “progressively more 
expensive” due to the “cumulative cost of maintenance and to the increased cost of 
weapons.”24 Others outside the administration were highly critical of the “giveaway 
mania” of foreign aid programs which supported “projects too dubious to attract
9 Sprivate capital.” And Congress, too, had become “thoroughly fed up with foreign 
aid” expenditures.26 Faced with growing criticism of aid programs, the administration
20 Dulles’s point hints at a policy aimed at revealing the contradictions o f the Soviet system both politically and 
economically. Dulles hoped foreign aid would exacerbate tensions between the Soviet Union and its satellites as 
well as place the Soviet Union at a disadvantage in terms o f the ability to spend on economic assistance. The 
policy can be seen as a precursor o f Reagan era hyper-military spending that placed the Soviet Union at a severe 
disadvantage, ultimately adding to the pressures that toppled the regime.
21 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 118. “Memorandum o f Discussion Between the President’s Citizen Advisers 
on the Mutual Security Program and the Secretary of State, Washington, October 25, 1956.” In the mind of Dulles, 
the Soviet policy was a chess game, in which the Soviets wished to move to “checkmate,” at which time, they 
would inhabit a position “of such superiority that war w on’t be necessary.”
22 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 120-121.
23 Thomas Zoumas, Reevaluating Eisenhower: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy: The Case o f  Latin 
America, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 156. Zoumas takes this quote from a letter from Eisenhower 
to John Foster Dulles, June 20, 1952.
24 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, IX, 121. “Memorandum of Discussion Between the President’s Citizen Advisers 
on the Mutual Security Program and the Secretary of State, Washington, October 25, 1956.” See also Peter Toma, 
The Politics o f  Food fo r  Peace: Executive-Legislative Interaction (Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1967), 26. 
In his book, Toma describes the four periods of post-WWII aid and recognizes that the United States makes a shift 
from military support to economic assistance. He stated that, by 1963, economic assistance accounted for more 
than “three times the military assistance” of U.S. aid programs.
25 Henry Hazlitt, “The Giveaway Mania Grows,” Newsweek, 29 (November 1954): 90.
26 “Needed: New Kind o f Foreign Aid,” Business Week, 9 (September 1954): 166-167.
16
began to investigate new, less expensive forms of aid. One option -  intriguing 
because of multiple potential benefits -  was the use of agricultural surpluses. 
Theoretically, the use of food and fiber as aid would assist not only the people of the 
recipient nation, but also American farmers and taxpayers by reducing the domestic
surplus and its associated costs. Further, it was a non-aggressive and peace-oriented
* • • * 21 type of aid, beneficial in both image and development in the recipient country.
By the fall of 1956, the administration formulated the New Look strategy in
-y n
economic aid spending. Fiscally conservative, the Eisenhower administration 
sought to find the “best and cheapest means” to “prevent the Iron Curtain from 
advancing further.”29 In Eisenhower’s view, the United States had not gone about its 
aid policy in the right way; that is, to first consider U.S. national security interests.
30The next step was to determine the effects upon the recipient nations. The basic 
concept on which Eisenhower’s policy was premised was providing aid while 
simultaneously curbing the associated costs.
Flowever, efforts to reduce outright dollar aid did not come without 
repercussions. The administration felt it necessary not to alarm any nation in which 
aid or military support would be reduced or modified. In the minds of key leaders, it 
was important to maintain stability, and any efforts to reduce aid or to modify aid’s 
nature should not result in destabilization. By maintaining stability, the administration 
hoped to foster private investment by U.S. and European corporations. The dilemma
27 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 130-131. “Memorandum of Discussion at the 301st Meeting o f the National 
Security Council, Washington, October 26, 1956.”
28 Douglas Kinnard, The Secretary o f  Defense, (Lexington, KY, 1980) p. 44-45.
29 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, IX, 130-131. “Memorandum of Discussion at the 301st Meeting of the National 
Security Council.”
30 Ibid., 130. U.S. national security interests included military, political, and economic concerns.
17
of not alarming recipient nations while still making aid palatable domestically was not 
easy, however. In fact, for the NSC, the U.S. aid program was viewed as “the most 
critical problem facing the present administration.” In addition, the solution for the 
aid problem was one in which the NSC “[didn’t] yet have the slightest idea what the
o  i
answer [was].”
Soviet Aid and the Escalation of Economic Warfare
Through 1956 the Eisenhower administration found itself increasingly alarmed 
by the threat of Soviet economic aid programs. The working group of the 
Subcommittee on Soviet Economic Penetration determined that since 1953, the Soviet 
Union had employed economic aid programs aimed at the underdeveloped world. The 
Soviet Union had spent in excess of $1 billion on aid and credits in addition to $360 
million for arms. Although this amounted to far less than the economic aid provided 
globally by the Unites States, this new economic offensive launched by the Soviet 
Union placed the United States in a defensive position (see Appendix Tables 1.1 &
'X'} .1.2). Specifically, the administration felt threatened by the Soviet Union’s 
successful exploitation of “nationalistic fervor, anti-colonialism, and neutralism in 
underdeveloped countries from Eastern Europe to Southeast Asia.”
31 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, IX, 129-132. “Memorandum of Discussion at the 301st Meeting o f the National 
Security Council.”
32 Between 1953 and 1955, the United States spent in excess of $13.8 billion on economic and military assistance 
in the form of loans and grants. See U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Green book, available 
from World Wide Web: http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/index.html. See Appendix Tables 1.1 & 1.2.
33 FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy; Foreign Information Program 1955-1957, IX, 44-45. “Report by the Working 
Group o f the Subcommittee on Soviet Economic Penetration, Washington, March 11, 1957.”
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Additionally, the Soviet Union capitalized on the discontent from the United 
States’ adherence to a non-competition policy, wherein the United States avoided 
offering assistance to nations that competed with U.S. agriculture. By buying up rice 
from an underdeveloped nation, a commodity the United States held in surplus and 
refused to purchase, the Soviets made inroads while U.S. prestige was hurt. The State 
Department correctly believed such non-competition policies raised “doubts as to [the 
United States’] real intentions in giving aid.” Another problem was that too often U.S. 
aid was not beneficial to the population and was viewed by many as aiding the 
wealthy. Many of these issues were at least partially due to U.S. “procedural 
complexities,” bureaucracy, and rules that offended recipient countries.34
It became increasingly important to conjure ways to overcome Soviet success. 
The State Department suggested a renewed emphasis on the goals of foreign aid. 
Further, beliefs such as those suggested by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
Howard Jones that “whether we like it or not, we are in the midst of economic 
warfare” emphasized the need to remain steadfast in the struggle against communist
35expansion. The administration believed the U.S. should “not outbid but out­
perform” the Soviet programs in an effort to gamer the popular support of the 
recipient nation. Beyond better propaganda, the aid program had to become more
34 FRUS, Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 134-135. “Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary o f State for 
Far Eastern Economic Affairs (Jones) to the Special Assistant to the President (Randall), Washington, November 
20, 1956.”
35 Ibid., 134. “Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Economic Affairs 
(Jones) to the Special Assistant to the President (Randall), Washington, November 20, 1956.” As quoted, “and the 
entire aid program should, in my opinion, recognize th is .. .U.S. policy objectives.. .may be summarized as follows: 
to curb the power and prevent the expansion of international Communism and increase the strength and expand the 
influence o f free world countries.”
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flexible in its ability to assess and respond quickly and effectively. By so doing, the
36United States could maintain the foreign aid program as a “major cold war weapon.” 
As a result, agricultural surpluses became a sort of weapon. One 
recommendation aimed at increasing private investment and “strengthening the areas
37against Soviet penetration” involved the use of agricultural surpluses. The Working
Group of the Subcommittee on Soviet Economic Penetration suggested that it was 
important to “maximize the economic benefits of surplus agricultural disposal
38programs for underdeveloped areas” while minimizing the negative effects.
However, other groups, such as the Fairless Committee (chaired by Benjamin F. 
Fairless and made up of advisers to the President on the Mutual Security Program), 
felt differently and recommended “a return to sound commercial marketing procedure
39in the disposal of surpluses of agricultural commodities.” The committee also 
contended that the disposal of agricultural surpluses should be kept separate from 
foreign assistance activities.40 Such a move was not approved by the Departments of 
State and Agriculture, as they continued to view agricultural surpluses as a valuable 
tool of foreign policy. In response to the Fairless proposal, the State Department
36 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X , 134-137.
37 FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1955-1957, IX, 49-50. In the “Report by the Working Group of the 
Subcommittee on Soviet Economic Penetration, Washington, March 11, 1957,” in section IV, item b., the 
committee recommended the actions: “ 1. Seek to maximize the direct and indirect benefits o f surplus agricultural 
disposal actions on the economic developments o f the areas with particular emphasis on private sectors. 2. In 
considering surplus agricultural disposal actions, afford increased recognition to the direct and indirect adverse 
impact o f such actions on the export markets o f underdeveloped areas.”
38 Ibid., 50. Essentially, the report suggested a number of concepts aimed most directly at fostering private sector 
investment incentives, in the hope that such investments would bolster direct U.S. aid dollars.
39 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 118, 159. The Fairless Committee was made up o f Benjamin F. Fairless 
(chairman), Colgate W. Darden, Richard R. Dupree, John L. Lewis, Whitelaw Reid, W alter Bedell Smith, and Jesse 
W. Tapp, and they served as advisers to the President on the Mutual Security Program.
40 Ibid. “Fairless Rec. #13,” 159-160. This recommendation would do the following: “a. eliminate local currency 
transactions both under Public Law 480 and Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act; b. provide for disposals for 
dollars only, at reduced prices, in cases where normal markets would not be disturbed; c. extend aid in the form of 
agricultural surpluses through appropriations in the aid program for the purchase of such commodities at world 
market prices from the CCC.”
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countered that surpluses were important as foreign aid -  as long as they did not hurt 
commercial sales. This position was supported by the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) and the NSC. The basis for this pro-agricultural surplus-as-aid 
view stemmed from the consideration that, though surpluses could have a negative 
impact on foreign commercial markets, security issues overshadowed the pure 
economic factors suggested by Fairless. At its core, such a view substantiated 
agriculture’s importance to the cold war.
Faced with the Soviet aid policy, the Eisenhower administration moved toward 
“a new emphasis on long-term economic development as a major objective of foreign 
policy.”41 This strategy fit within the administration’s effort to rethink and reshape its 
foreign policy in response to the Soviet Union’s less militaristic initiatives.42 The 
Eisenhower policy attempted to take a position that, regardless of the existence of a 
Soviet aid threat, it was in the best interest of the United States to provide foreign aid.
43 Further, although military assistance was required, Secretary Dulles believed that 
“by and large” the United States “should probably put greater emphasis on our 
assistance to less developed countries for their economic development, and less 
emphasis on military assistance.”44
The Soviet inroads into the underdeveloped world had succeeded through 
aggressive aid and assistance programs as well as the export of their Russian model of
41 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, IX, 171. “In a Letter from the acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the 
Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Randall), Washington, March 16, 1957.”
42 Ibid., 171.
43 Ibid., 181. “Memorandum o f Discussion at the 320lh Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington,
April 17, 1957.”
44 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 181-182. Dulles further stated that economic assistance needed to be planned 
on a long-term basis, and it should be a goal. Dulles reiterated his apprehension toward the Soviet’s successful 
usage o f the Soviet experiment and its acceptance among needy countries looking to develop quickly.
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the socialist experiment and rapid industrialization.45 The Eisenhower response 
sought to reinvigorate the U.S. aid program into a flexible, responsive, and efficient 
program aimed at garnering the attention of recipient nations’ population and 
government. Although the total value of U.S. aid greatly outpaced Soviet aid, that 
disparity did little to alleviate the greater fear of Soviet aid potential.46 At its essence, 
the aid battle was one waged to win the hearts and minds -  and thereby the allegiance 
-  of a recipient country. In the worldwide cold war struggle, battles for allies and 
influence could not be overestimated.
One of the results of Soviet aid inroads was a reformulation of U.S. economic 
aid policy that served not only to try to reduce the dependence on military aid and 
security, in accord with an overall Eisenhower New Look strategy, but also to make 
agricultural surpluses more important in their role as a weapon and tool of foreign 
policy. Because of its developmental ability, its non-military qualities, its propaganda, 
and lastly its cheaper cost, food was used as a powerful, benign tool of foreign policy 
aimed at thwarting Soviet aid efforts and winning over the affection of the recipient 
nation.
To Trade or Not to Trade: Two Views on Trade
While the Soviet Union began a competing foreign aid program and the United 
States attempted to formulate a policy to combat it, the United States continued to
45 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 32-33. Dulles, among others, was wholly fearful o f this new tactic o f the 
Soviet Union.
46Joseph S. Berliner, Soviet Economic Aid: The New A id  and Trade Policy in Underdeveloped Countries, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1958). Printed in 1958, this study exemplifies the seriousness with which the West 
viewed Soviet aid programs.
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debate whether or not to trade with the Communist bloc. Two differing views 
emerged: those who argued for liberal trade policies and the power of open markets 
and those tethered to cold war rhetoric and national security, who favored an embargo 
on ideological grounds. Those who held the first view -  generally members of the 
State Department -  felt strongly that attempts to limit Soviet industrial expansion were 
not worthwhile, as Soviet development was inevitable. Thus, they argued that the 
wiser course was to allow trade in order for Western interests to benefit from the 
inevitable Soviet growth (rather than deny the West of potentially lucrative markets). 
The opposing view -  formulated chiefly by the Department of Defense (DOD) -  held 
that “any delay in Soviet industrial expansion is important and valuable to U.S. 
security.”47 Further, they argued that additional trade limits -  rather than relaxed 
controls -  should be administered. Due to political and security concerns, the DOD
48view generally prevailed especially within Congress.
These two views continued to compete throughout Eisenhower’s first term. 
Following the DOD view, the United States formulated a trade policy that attempted 
to impose as much damage as possible on the Communist bloc. Even so, Dulles, as 
well as leaders of allied nations, continued to press for a more liberal and flexible 
trade policy. Dulles, in particular, considered “Western trade controls a valuable
47 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 222. “Memorandum -  From Deputy Assistant Secretary o f Defense for 
International Security Affairs (Davis) to Chairman o f CFEP (Dodge), Washington, February 23, 1955.” And from 
“Memorandum of Discussion at the 254lh Meeting o f the National Security Council, Washington, July 7, 1955,” 
239-240.
48 Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Agricultural Exports, Farm Income, and the Eisenhower Administration, (Lincoln: 
University o f Nebraska Press, 1979), 128, 136. Peterson explains how Congressional fears and hesitance resulted 
in non-support o f liberalized trade with the bloc.
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trump card.”49 In fact, he felt that the United States could “obtain important political 
concessions from the Russians by offering to relax Western controls over exports of 
strategic goods to the bloc by making U.S. agricultural surplus commodities available 
at favorable terms.”50 At a meeting of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy 
(CFEP) in the fall of 1955, support was given to amending Public Law 480 for barter 
of government agricultural surpluses with the Soviet bloc for strategic material, but 
not for local currencies. Essentially, the CFEP agreed with utilizing agricultural 
surpluses in trade with the Soviet bloc. In a letter in January of 1956 from Francis 
Dodge, Chairman of the CFEP, to Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr.,
Dodge disagreed with the Dulles position, saying that the Soviet bloc had more to gain 
from reduced trade controls than the West.
Others in the administration agreed with Dodge and were not so confident the 
Soviets would make concessions for relaxed trade controls or for U.S. surplus 
agricultural commodities.51 Despite food shortages and massive agricultural 
problems, the Soviet Union was limited by a lack of foreign currency. It was unable 
to purchase goods even if it desired to do so. Members of the State Department felt 
that, though U.S. agricultural surpluses would assist with collectivization in Eastern 
Europe, the benefits to the Soviet Union were not “of sufficient importance as to
49 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 236. “Memorandum From the Chief of the Division of Functional Intelligence 
(Doherty) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence (Armstrong), Washington, June 24, 
1955.”
50 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X., 236, & 263-264. “Minutes of the 28th Meeting o f the Council on Foreign 
Economic Policy, Executive Office Building, Washington, October 11, 1955, 4 p.m.”
51 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 23 6-237. “Memorandum From the Chief o f the Division of Functional 
Intelligence (Doherty) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary o f State for Intelligence (Armstrong), Washington, 
June 24, 1955.”
52 Trudy Huskamp Peterson, “Sales, Surpluses, and the Soviets: A Study in Political Economy” -  in The Role o f  
U.S. Agriculture in Foreign Policy, edited by Richard Fraenkel, Don Hadwiger, William Browne (Praeger 
Publishers: New York, 1979), 58.
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warrant [their] making any real political concessions.”53 Essentially, the ‘carrot’ of 
agricultural trade would not be enough to entice the Soviet Union to make any 
political concessions. Although this argument plausibly refuted Dulles’s position, it 
also supported the reverse -  namely that trade in agricultural goods was sufficiently 
unimportant to the Soviet Union and that it, indeed, would be wise for the United 
States to engage in it, regardless.
The changes in Soviet tactics concerning foreign economic aid and trade had 
succeeded in painting the United States as the nation wishing to maintain an “Iron 
Curtain” around the Soviet bloc by not reducing trade controls.54 Disturbed by the 
propaganda coup, many administration officials began to feel that there was no 
advantage in continuing such strident trade sanctions. As trade restrictions 
increasingly were seen as a potential liability for the United States, inquiries were 
made into the tolerability of engaging in trade with the Communist bloc. In August of 
1955 at a State Department meeting, a frank discussion on the possibility of trade and, 
in particular, trading agricultural goods with the Soviet bloc, took place.55 The 
conversation regarding trade of agricultural surpluses was led by Deputy Under 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Samuel C. Waugh. Waugh “pointed to the 
magnitude of our disposal problem and suggested that the Soviet bloc was one place 
where we might be able to dispose of substantial quantities of our surpluses.” He also 
believed that the United States could sell the commodities for gold at world prices.
53 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 237.
54 Ibid, 106. “Memorandum From the Chief o f the International Branch, Bureau o f the Budget (Macy) to the 
Director o f the Bureau (Brundage), Washington, September 4, 1956.”
55 Ibid., 250-254. “Memorandum of a Conversation, Department o f State, Washington, August 11, 1955.
Participants: The Secretaiy, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Waugh, Hollister, Merchant, Robertson, Jones, and Goodkind.
Subject: Current East-W est Trade problems.”
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When questioned about the February 1955 Attorney General’s ruling disallowing even 
limited trade in surplus goods, Waugh suggested the ruling be reviewed and that 
overall agricultural trade policy be reconsidered.56
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Livingston T. Merchant 
proposed that the United States investigate a one-time operation of trading agricultural 
goods with the bloc, with the stipulation that the United States could halt the operation 
before it could get difficult to control. However, Secretary Dulles wavered, fearing 
that the United States could not stop the process once it began. The meeting transcript 
stated that Dulles “was clear that we could cut off automobiles or machinery whenever 
we chose, but with agricultural surpluses,” he wondered, “would we not be whetting 
our own appetites as well as the Russians’? Might we not be building up political 
pressures that we could not control?” Ultimately, Dulles “[did] not want to start 
something we couldn’t stop.” It was clear that despite potential benefits of such a 
move, overshadowing these benefits were concerns of security, political sentiment, 
and agricultural pressure -  therefore making it unwise to attempt a move of liberalized 
trade. Although Waugh was confident that public and farm opinion could be 
controlled, the State Department was hesitant to act. Regardless, they continued to 
pursue the idea.57
Dulles’s assertion of a difference between trade in industrially produced goods, 
such as automobiles, and trade in agricultural goods was an interesting distinction. 
Judith Goldstein, a professor at Stanford University, explained in an article in
56 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X., 250-254.
57 Ibid., 253.
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International Organization that a dichotomy existed between industrial and 
agricultural trade policies. Goldstein asserted that industrial trade policy migrated 
from a protectionist view to a liberalized stance during the 1930s; however, 
agricultural policies remained entrenched in protectionism. Goldstein also stated that, 
while manufacturing interests gradually influenced a liberalized trade policy, no 
collective voice for liberalized agricultural policy existed.58 Opening trade with the 
bloc might awaken that voice, and Dulles was wary. Further, Dulles’s remark 
demarcating a difference in agricultural and industrial goods was grounded deeply in 
U.S. trade policy. His position hinted at an attitude that Goldstein described as 
favoring a policy meant to “maximize a nation’s self-sufficiency,” which served 
“strategic reasons” by maintaining surplus stocks in the event of a catastrophe.59
The Trade Wedge
Circumstances such as the continued surplus issue coupled with the threat of 
Soviet foreign aid mobilized the Eisenhower administration to strongly consider freer 
trade of agricultural goods with the Soviet bloc. In early 1956, Eisenhower asked 
Congress to repeal the limitations written into Public Law 480 that blocked trade of 
agricultural surpluses with nations behind the Iron Curtain. Alternatively, the 
administration also requested that the Attorney General review and possibly modify 
the ban on Public Law 480 trade with communist nations. The President believed that 
trade, no matter with whom, was beneficial in economic terms and in developing
58 Judith Goldstein, “The Impact o f Ideas on Trade Policy: The origins of U.S. Agricultural and Manufacturing 
Policies,” International Organization, 43, Issue 1, (Winter, 1989): 31-33.
59 Ibid., 34.
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relationships — ultimately strengthening peace. Eisenhower did wish to restrict trade 
in strategic material, but he did not see U.S. agricultural surpluses as being 
substantially strategic. Essentially, Eisenhower viewed the Soviet bloc as a potential 
market. Congress did not. Conservatives, like Republican Congressman Walter Judd 
of Minnesota opposed the President’s request and refused to authorize liberalized trade
f\C\rules with the Soviet bloc.
One reason for opposition to freer trade was the belief that trade with the 
Soviet Union was not valuable enough to pursue. According to an NSC memo in 
1956, trade with the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc did not have a great material value, 
nor did it promise a great potential market. The memo stated that the Soviet Union 
imported approximately $2 billion worth of goods annually from 1948-1955, with 
only a small portion from the United States.61 U.S. agricultural exports to the entire 
Soviet bloc amounted to just $2 million in 1953 ($1.5 million of which was tobacco 
and wool rags), and exports increased to $6 million in 1954, much of which was for 
flood relief in Eastern Europe.62 The Soviet Union had greatly increased food imports 
during the post World War II period and had become a net importer of food.63 Yet, in 
spite of views that reduced controls could double trade, this NSC memo concluded
60 FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1955-1957, IX., 183-185. “Memorandum o f Discussion at the 282nd Meeting of 
the National Security Council, Washington, April 26, 1956.” See also Peterson, “Sales, Surpluses, and the 
Soviets,” in U.S. Agriculture in Foreign Policy, 63. Peterson asserts that Congress was unwilling to approve 
liberalized trade outright, just as the Eisenhower administration was unwilling to push openly for trade 
liberalization; both were hindered by the fears o f domestic political ramifications. Such opposition to trade with 
the Soviet bloc can be traced to World War II and the post-war era in acts such as the Decontrol Act o f 1947, the 
Economic Cooperation Act o f 1948, the Export Control Act o f 1949, and the Trade Agreements Act o f 1951, in 
which trade in commodities o f a “strategic” nature were banned. Though these bans were meant for military 
supplies, they were extended to agricultural goods as well. Also, Peterson, Agricultural Exports, p. 128.
61 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 347. “Memo on Discussion of 282nd Meeting of the National Security 
Council, Washington, April 26, 1956.”
62 FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1955-1957, IX, 114-115.
63 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X , 346-347.
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that the total amount of potential trade remained small and was not particularly 
enticing to the United States.64 However, this memo stands in contrast to an article by 
scholar Trudy Huskamp Peterson in U.S. Agriculture in Foreign Policy, in which the 
trade figures between the fourth quarters of 1947 and 1952 were compared. That 
period saw a 99.7% drop in trade (from $114,061,000 to $319,000).65 Clearly, there 
was potential for trade, and the heightened cold war had suffocated it. Peterson’s 
figures hint not only at how difficult it was to calculate potential trade with the bloc, 
but also how dramatically fears of communism had influenced U.S. policy.
Further, legal hurdles, such as a February 1955 ruling by the Justice 
Department that disallowed Public Law 480 barter deals and sales for local currency
f \ f \  •with communist countries, limited trade even in surplus goods. Thus, by the mid 
1950s -  due primarily to domestic political concerns and anti-communism -  trade in 
agricultural goods with Soviet bloc nations remained a non-starter. Despite these 
hurdles, however, the idea continued to be discussed within the Eisenhower 
administration. The potential economic benefits of trade were only one aspect of the 
Eisenhower administration’s desire for freer trade. Increasingly, the administration 
came to value the benefits that trade leverage could have between the Soviet Union 
and the Soviet bloc.
64 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 347. Dulles stated East-West trade could double by 1960; still, it would only 
amount to 4% of total trade.
65 Peterson, “Sales, Surpluses, and the Soviets,” in U.S. Agriculture in Foreign Policy, 58.
66 FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1955-1957, IX, 114-115. The cabinet decided in February o f 1954 not to allow 
sales o f government-owned agricultural stocks by private traders for less than value, as it would be politically 
damaging domestically (housewives upset about butter price). Also, the Cabinet denied sales for cash, but allowed 
bartering for strategic goods (later blocked by the above February 1955 ruling). Thus, only commercial sales were 
allowed (of which the Soviet Union is not interested), and direct govemment-to-govemment cash sales for dollars, 
but this must be good for policy and not affect the world market or allies. See also Peterson, “Sales, Surpluses, and 
the Soviets,” in U.S. Agriculture in Foreign Policy, 61.
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The administration’s frustration at not being able to capitalize on trade 
leverage reached a boiling point following the April 1956 Attorney General’s ruling 
that no support existed for changing interpretations of Public Law 480 trade with the 
Soviet bloc. As a result, Dulles, greatly agitated, spoke to the inability of the United 
States to “seize and exploit” a “unique opportunity” in making in-roads with satellite 
countries of the Soviet Union. In Dulles’s opinion, the satellites were in a precarious 
position, with growing unrest and displeasure with the Soviet Union. Dulles 
suggested that “we were now in a position to make up an attractive shopping list” 
which we could present to the Czechs and others, which “would raise absolute hell in 
the Soviet bloc.”67 These views stood in marked contrast to the timidity Dulles 
displayed toward opening a one-time trade opportunity in August of 1955 (see p.
15).68 Clearly, for Dulles -  as with others in the administration -  there was a clear 
line of demarcation between open trade for trade purposes only and trade that also 
destabilized the Soviet bloc and provided advantages in the cold war.
Dulles further hypothesized that such an offer would force the Soviet Union to 
match or block the trade offer -  either of which would likely further strain relations 
between the Soviet Union and its satellites and might even lead to a complete collapse 
of their relationship. Dulles lamented the inability of the United States to seize such 
an opportunity, hinted that Congress had never understood the problem, and hoped
67 FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1955-1957, IX, 184. “Memorandum of Discussion at the 282nd Meeting of the 
National Security Council, Washington, April 26, 1956.” After consultation with other departments, the Attorney 
General believed there was no demand to open trade. Even a request for sales in dollars for purchase o f strategic 
material was denied.
68 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 250-254. “Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, August 11, 1955.” Participants: The Secretary, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Waugh, Hollister, Merchant, 
Robertson, Jones, and Goodkind, Foreign relations, 1955-1957, Volume Subject: Current East-W est Trade 
problems.
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that the United States could find a way to use the “vast U.S. surpluses in the interests 
of our national security.” In response to Dulles’s tirade, the transcript states: “The 
President smiled and said that it was extremely encouraging to him to have someone 
else make his speech for him.” The President seconded Dulles’s thoughts and called 
the Public Law 480 restrictions “damned foolishness.”69
At an NSC meeting in the spring of 1956, the issue of trade with the bloc 
reemerged. The President mentioned going to Congress again for action, but 
suggested avoiding the Agriculture Committee. Instead, Eisenhower believed that the 
Foreign Affairs or Foreign Relations Committees would be more favorable audiences. 
Vice President Richard Nixon and Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr. concurred, 
with the Vice President adding that it would be wise to stress the foreign policy 
prerogative of the requested changes. The President agreed and pressed to expedite 
the process. He also stressed promoting to Congress that the tactic was “strictly in the 
context of achieving our foreign policy objectives” and that the United States was 
“simply dangling some carrots before the satellite governments in order to increase the
70strength of their pull away from the Soviet Union.” The goal was clear: to utilize 
agricultural surplus as a wedge to splinter the cohesion of the Soviet bloc. Eisenhower
69 FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1955-1957, IX ., 184-185.
70 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 331-332. “Memorandum of Discussion at the 281sl Meeting o f the National 
Security Council, Washington, April 5, 1956.” A similar thought was mentioned by Dulles, as to whether shipping 
U.S. agricultural surpluses to Czechoslovakia might not be a wise decision, but a bureaucratic morass held up such 
a policy. Eisenhower then reiterated that trade restrictions should be removed and trade encouraged (331). 
Secretary Wilson stated that his conclusion was that the United States should either not trade with the Soviet Union 
or trade rather liberally (331-332). Dulles’s suggestion of selling agricultural goods to the Czechs was hindered by 
the ruling of the Attorney General regarding sales to Soviet bloc countries.
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stated, “You can say one thing: trade is the greatest weapon in the hands of the 
diplomat.”71
In June of 1956, Dulles sent a letter to the Chairman of the House Committee 
on Agriculture urging the repeal of Section 304 of Public Law 480 in order for the 
United States to engage in trade of surplus agricultural goods with the Soviet bloc. 
Dulles based his plea on the poor supply of food in Eastern Europe and the 
psychological effect of demonstrating the “bountiful fruits of freedom, which free 
nations share on a normal basis.” These proposed advances in trade were presented as 
temporary and could not be allowed to strengthen the military potential of the Soviet 
Union nor the satellites. Moreover, such trade advances were a foreign relations tactic
72and a means of relieving domestic surplus.
Not everyone agreed with the President’s recommendation. Members of the 
Council on Foreign Economic Policy and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) felt 
that any trade that “improved living standards, no matter what its nature, [became] a
73direct contribution to military power and industrialization” of the Soviet Union.
Still, others felt that the Soviet bloc’s ability to reallocate resources constituted a 
legitimate reason to consider their entire economy as part of their military power.74 
To those holding these views, trade could never be disassociated from military might 
and, thereby, could not be considered.
71 Peterson A gricu ltu ra l Exports, 49.
72 FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1955-1957, IX, 191-192. “Letter from the Secretary of State to the Chairman 
o f the House Committee on Agriculture (Cooley), Washington, June 7, 1956.”
73 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 217. “Memorandum from the Chairmen o f the CFEP (Dodge) to the DD or 
the CIA (Amory), Washington, February 7, 1955.” Dodge voiced these opinions, and Amory concurred.
74 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 222. “Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary o f Defense for 
International Security Affairs (Davis) to Chairman CFEP (Dodge) Washington, February 23, 1955.”
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Allies Balk at Trade Controls
Those in the administration favoring reduced trade controls found friends 
among U.S. allies who were growing annoyed with U.S. trade policy.75 The United 
States found itself under pressure from Great Britain, France, and other European and 
Asian allies who favored reduced trade controls. Still, despite the President’s requests, 
the formal U.S. position remained steadfast against any weakening of trade controls.
In fact, a National Intelligence Estimate downplayed this pressure by allies, reporting 
that those free world countries wanting reduced restrictions were motivated by 
“political and economic considerations not necessarily in consonance with U.S. 
views.” The report also mentioned that Soviet propaganda had successfully played on 
“national sensitivities, economic problems, and aspirations” of individual countries, 
while painting the United States as belligerent and the Soviet Union as wanting to 
conduct peaceful trade and to avoid war.76
Fueled in early 1956 by a growing sense that hostilities between the West and 
the Soviet bloc had abated, U.S. allies increasingly fell out of favor with the U.S. 
position of strict trade controls. Such pressure from allies, along with the 
ramifications of Soviet propaganda against U.S. trade policy, drove the Eisenhower 
administration to once again review its trade policy options -  much as it had its 
economic aid program. During an NSC meeting in late January 1956, President
75 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 275-276. “Letter From the Secretary of State to the President.” Along with 
trade issues with the Soviet bloc, increased tensions also were created in regards to easing or strengthening trade 
controls with communist China. Leading the effort to reduce controls were the UK, France, and Japan. All 
pressured for trade controls with China to be reduced to the level o f the Soviet bloc. The United States balked at 
this. The controls, multilaterally imposed, were threatened by the United Kingdom’s threat o f unilateral reductions 
in trade controls.
76 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 290-291. “Special National Intelligence Estimate -  SNIE 100-56 -  
Washington, January 17, 1956, Political Effects o f Relaxation of Controls on Trade with Communist China.”
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Eisenhower called for a study to show the “net advantage or disadvantage” of U.S. 
trade with the Soviet bloc. “We are in a country, surrounded by a lot of surplus
77materials,” testified President Eisenhower, “which we would like very much to sell.” 
The President wondered, if “there were virtually no obstacles placed in the way 
of trade between the Soviet bloc countries and the free world, what would this mean, 
in terms of dollars and cents, first, for the United States and afterwards for its major 
allies?” In addition, Eisenhower questioned the assumption held by Congress and 
others that trade obstacles hurt the Soviet cause. Instead, Eisenhower asserted that 
perhaps trade controls only hurt the United States and its allies by closing markets. 
Moreover, the President was alarmed by the insufficient data detailing this issue.
When NSC members questioned his request for a “net advantage or disadvantage” 
study of trade with the Soviet bloc, Eisenhower angrily rebuked the Council. 
Eisenhower was concerned that trade controls damaged U.S. interests more than the 
Soviet Union’s. Further, Eisenhower viewed trade as a means of creating mutual
78interests and, subsequently, mutual desire for peace.
On January 31, 1956, in response to Eisenhower’s request, CFEP Chairmen 
Dodge provided the report “Gains in Trade, Expressed in Dollars, Which Might 
Follow from the Virtual Elimination of all Controls on Trade with the Bloc” to the 
NSC. The report attempted to assign a dollar amount to the full elimination of all
• * 79trade controls, excluding arms and atomic energy material. As such, the report
11 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 302. “Memorandum of Discussion at the 274lh Meeting o f the National 
Security Council, Washington, January 26, 1956.”
78 Ibid., 303.
79 Ibid., 314. “Memorandum From the Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Dodge) to the Staff 
Assistant to the President (Goodpaster).”
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stated that the free world might increase annual trade by $350 million. Of this total, 
$150 million would be a result of loosened restrictions with China. Dodge reported 
that the increased trade (a potential 15% increase) “would be very small in relation to 
total Free World trade.”80 Dodge stated in the memo: “Such an increase is too small 
to be of significant benefit to the Free World as a whole; although to a number of
81business firms, particularly in Japan, this improvement in trade would be important.” 
Further, the report was solidly influenced by existing U.S. policy -  vis a vis the Soviet 
Union -  and not, as the President intended, an objective reassessment of trade 
potential. Essentially, Eisenhower’s question about increased trade being a boon to 
the United States more than the Soviet Union was not fully considered.
Even though the Dodge report discounted the possible advantages the West 
might gamer by increasing trade with the Soviet bloc, Eisenhower continued to 
express his desire for the removal of trade restrictions. In the President’s opinion, 
trade restrictions had been passed at the height of McCarthyism and its hysteria, and 
he felt that a “fresh look” at trade was in order.83 Secretary Dulles seconded the 
President’s sentiment. In Dulles’s opinion, sitting on “a vast pile of ammunition in the 
shape of food and agricultural products” was “ridiculous.” Dulles further stated that 
Soviet purchases of surpluses from underdeveloped countries caused problems for the 
United States; he hoped that possible sales of surpluses by the United States within the
80 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 314.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 314-315. Dodge warned that the bloc’s focus on development would be assisted by its large natural 
resource base. It was likely that the bloc would increase imports of some electronic and machinery items, but 
Dodge felt it unlikely that -  given fewer restrictions — the bloc would substantially increase trade. Dodge’s report 
was extremely pessimistic and appeared to avoid some of the real questions Eisenhower had asked, particularly 
regarding surpluses.
83 Ibid., 333. “Memorandum o f Discussion at the 281st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 
April 5, 1956.”
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Soviet bloc might cause problems for the Soviet Union. The President felt that the 
administration had been too concerned with how Congress would feel about trade with 
the Soviet bloc, and Congress -  moved more by domestic political considerations than 
by foreign policy -  was unwilling to see the benefit of a reassessment of trade with the 
bloc.84
Ultimately, international events abruptly halted the Eisenhower 
administration’s efforts. As noted, by early 1956, both President Eisenhower and the 
State Department (Dulles, Hoover, and others) had become sympathetic toward 
reducing trade controls (specifically in agricultural goods) and utilizing Public Law 
480 stocks as trade bait with bloc nations. Initially, domestic pressure from Congress 
and the DOD stymied their efforts to revise trade policy. However, just as Eisenhower 
and his staff seemed poised to force a change, the renewal of Soviet aggression in the 
fall of 1956 following the Suez crisis brought to a halt any efforts to weaken trade 
barriers. Sustained by the distraction of the Suez crisis, the Soviet Union put down the 
Hungarian revolt in the fall of 195 6.85 In one fell swoop, Soviet aggression made the 
increasingly untenable U.S. position of adhering to stricter trade controls tenable 
again. Administration members favoring strict controls were able to capitalize on 
these renewed fears of Soviet aggression to push for a renewal of trade controls. 
Ultimately, these events ended any hopes of increasing trade with communist nations.
Yet with time, the option of increased trade with the Soviet Union lingered as a 
possibility. In June of 1958, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev sent a letter to
84 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X , 333-334.
85 LaFeber, America, 185-186.
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President Eisenhower requesting renewed trade between their two nations.86 The 
Eisenhower administration’s consideration of the letter focused on the various political 
repercussions such efforts would engender. The administration determined that a 
softening of trade controls might alienate members of the anti-communist coalition 
(NATO, SEATO, etc.), undermine anti-Soviet elements within the Soviet bloc, and 
destabilize U.S. interests in the underdeveloped world. However, these concerns were 
secondary to trepidation regarding domestic political consequences. The anti­
communist establishment remained a powerful influence in domestic politics, 
dissuading the administration from definitive action. As a result, Khrushchev’s 
request did not receive a favorable response.88
Although political pressure and administration inaction were large hurdles to 
overcome, studies continued to investigate the potential of relaxed trade restrictions 
with the bloc. A Special National Intelligence Estimate conducted in the fall of 1958 
documented the effects of increased trade between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. In particular, the report emphasized the view expressed by many nations that 
increased trade would likely be interpreted as a positive easing of tensions between the 
two countries. Further, though the Soviet Union would benefit more from increased 
trade, it was not anticipated that such trade would benefit their military capacity in any 
significant manner. Political ramifications abroad -  such as in South Korea,
Nationalist China, and Japan -  were viewed as the most likely significant detriment.
86 Nikita Khrushchev, “Expansion of Trade Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union: Letter From 
the Chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) to the President of the United States 
(Eisenhower), June 2, 1 9 5 8 American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, (Washington D.C.: 1958), 846-850.
87 FRUS: Foreign A id  1958-1960, IV, 714-718. “Memorandum Prepared in the Department o f State, Notes on the 
Expansion o f US-Soviet Union Trade, June 16, 1958.”
88FRUS: Foreign A id  1958-1960, IV, 716.
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The report, however, made increased trade seem rather benign. Of course, the report 
also refrained from commenting upon domestic political concern -  an important 
caveat.89
Trade talk ultimately succumbed to intensified rhetoric and fears that it was 
undesirable to trade goods in which the West held an advantage over the Soviet 
Union.90 Ultimately, cold war pressures, domestic politics, and an intensified Soviet 
economic aid program doomed trade opportunities with the bloc during the 
Eisenhower administration. In particular, trade in agricultural goods also was 
doomed, because food and fiber were viewed as strategic. Despite desires for freer 
trade, the Eisenhower administration -  motivated by ideology and fear -  sought to 
limit any potential gain the Soviet Union might attain through free trade. Limiting 
trade with the bloc fit into an overall containment policy, even though it contradicted 
basic economic principles. Security and fear prevailed over free trade.. .and the 
potential of relieving surpluses through sales to the communist world never 
materialized.
Conclusion
Foreign policy during the 1950s was beset by fear and apprehension. Policy 
and regulations were limited by McCarthyism and its resonance. As a result, trade 
relations with the Soviet bloc were limited in scope by political and security concerns. 
Such fears contradicted President Eisenhower’s original emphasis on “trade not aid”
89 FRUS: Foreign A id  1958-1960, IV, 735-742. From “Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 100-8-58, 
Implications o f an Increase in US-Soviet Trade, October 7, 1958.”
90 FRUS: Foreign A id  1958-1960, IV, 48-49. “Memorandum of Conversation, June 4, 1959, between CFEP and 
German Minister Erhard.”
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and created a divergent opinion between Congress and the administration.91 
Eisenhower, for one, seemed more and more interested in opening up free trade, with 
the exception of arms and atomic materials. This concept stood in stark contrast to 
many more conservative views in Congress and the DOD. The fascination of the 
United States with security, the fear and respect of Soviet military might, and the 
deterrence-containment philosophy inhibited the use of economic policy as an 
aggressive way of confronting the contradictions of the communist system. Instead of 
an offensive policy aimed at free trade to benefit domestic industries and splinter the 
bloc, an economic defense policy was enacted that limited trade.
These policy decisions were shrouded in fear and misunderstanding and had 
dramatic effects on U.S. economic policy. Although the trade possibilities with the 
Soviet bloc and China were unknown, such opportunities might have benefited aspects 
of the U.S. economy, particularly agriculture. Both the Soviet bloc and China, despite 
vast resources for agricultural production, were unable during the 1950s to completely 
fulfill their food and fiber needs and might have imported additional goods if given the 
opportunity. Such a market may have offered direct sale possibilities for the U.S. 
farmer. Further, Eisenhower, Dulles, and others felt that free trade might have 
highlighted the contradictions of the communist world and caused fractures in the Iron 
Curtain, a view in consonance with Director of the Policy Planning Staff George
QTKerman’s original view of the Soviet system. Trade with the bloc failed because
91 Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy 1953-1961 (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1982), 7.
92 See “X,” “The Sources o f Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs (July 1947): 566-582. See also George Kennan, 
American Diplomacy, Expanded Edition, (Chicago: The University o f  Chicago Press, 1984). Kennan’s article
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domestic political repercussions were feared. Both the real and imagined fears of the 
communist threat, used so effectively to harness popular support both at home and 
abroad, also frustrated any attempt to engage in trade with the bloc. As Trudy 
Huskamp Peterson noted in her article Sales, Surpluses, and the Soviets, “Clearly the 
United States, in a fit of anti-Communist self-abnegation, repeatedly ignored sales 
opportunities behind the Iron Curtain. . . .The losers during the embargo years were 
the farmers and the taxpayers. Prices could have been strengthened and storage costs
Q -l
reduced if substantial Soviet-bloc sales had materialized.”
The surpluses did provide the Eisenhower administration with a valuable asset 
in its foreign economic strategy -  namely aid. As such, U.S. agricultural production 
increasingly moved from the blight of surplus to a valuable cold war tool. Surplus 
goods provided a counterweight to Soviet aid packages. However, even as the use of 
aid more deeply entrenched agriculture into the cold war struggle, it did little to 
alleviate the surplus, itself. Instead, agriculture’s entrenchment in foreign policy more 
clearly defined food and fiber as a strategic asset. As such, a ‘we have, you don’t, you 
won’t’ framework arose. This Fortress America-esqe philosophy, a hallmark of the 
Republican right wing, sought to make the United States independently able to sustain 
itself in a nuclear confrontation and fostered a ‘keep-away’ mentality that thwarted 
attempts to liberalize trade with the bloc.94 Further, much like fears of missile gaps 
and bomber gaps, a pseudo-food gap existed in which the United States’ bounty was
compared the Soviet system to a wind-up car that would eventually run out o f energy. Kennan felt that the inherent 
contradictions o f Soviet ideology would eventually cause the Soviet system to collapse.
93 Peterson, “Sales, Surpluses, and the Soviets,” in U.S. Agriculture in Foreign Policy, 71.
94 Richard Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy, (Wilmington,
DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), 41.
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held as a symbolic weapon. This food shield sought to undermine Soviet aggression -  
just as the nation’s nuclear weapon stockpile did. Food power was a real tool of aid 
and development, but perhaps more so a symbol of American might.
As a result, agriculture’s role in foreign policy was cemented during the 1950s. 
Though lip service was paid to reducing surpluses, the needs and fears of the cold war 
made such declarations ring hollow. U.S. food production was such a clear advantage, 
and it was perceived
as such a strategic tool, that any efforts to bring agricultural policy into sound 
economic alignment were thwarted by cold war considerations. Efforts to reduce food 
surpluses via trade or policy change fell limp in the face of the surpluses’ importance 
as aid, development funding agent, trade lever, or -  most importantly -  strategic 
stockpile. In 1957 Bruce Johnston wrote about the United States in the journal World 
Politics, reminding that “on two occasions in our recent history accumulated stocks of 
agricultural commodities, which were becoming uncomfortably large, were abruptly 
transformed into valuable assets.” Johnston referred to surplus stocks prior to World 
War II and the Korean conflict and alluded to the mentality that surpluses might 
become a valuable asset quickly. The cold war, to some, provided impetus to maintain 
surplus stocks.95 As such, the cold war and the Eisenhower administration elevated 
farmers into cold warriors.
95 Bruce F. Johnston, “Farm Surpluses and Foreign Policy,” World Politics, Vol. 10, Issue 1 (Oct., 1957), 11.
The Food Shield
41
Food as a Weapon
Before the Eisenhower administration began struggling with the contradictory 
questions of combating Soviet foreign aid and the possibility of opening trade with the 
bloc in the mid-1950s, they faced the problem of agricultural surplus stockpiles. The 
surplus mound fueled political rancor and led to a melding of humanitarian ethos, 
political expedience, and pragmatism readily seen in the legislation that became the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 -  or Public Law 480. 
Meant as a developmental program as well as a surplus reducer and market creator, the 
cold war elevated it to an invaluable aspect of foreign policy. Yet, it was more 
broadly an emblem of a chaotic agricultural policy.
Public Law 480 was passed and signed into law during the spring and summer 
of 1954 after a series of competing interests agreed to compromise. A wide variety of 
pressures from government agencies, Congress, and the farm lobby assured that the 
law “represented the best in legislative logrolling and buck-passing.” 1 Initially, the 
Eisenhower administration was confident that a solution to the surplus issue “would
'y
not be hard to secure.” However, such simplicity was not realized. Inter­
departmental squabbling, agricultural sector lobbying, and partisan politics resulted in 
many recommendations. Ultimately, the administration was able to draft a
1 Peterson, Agricultural Exports, 33-43. Peterson offers a concise background on the formulation of Public Law 
480.
2 Ibid., 33.
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compromise bill that sampled from the rival proposals. Trudy Huskamp Peterson
wrote in Agricultural Exports, Farm Income, and the Eisenhower Administration:
In administering Public Law 480, the administration continuously 
balanced conflicting objectives. The legislation was all things to all
people: surplus disposal, humanitarian relief, cold war weapon,
->
domestic farm income stabilizer.
Ultimately, Public Law 480 failed to succeed in its intended purpose of 
alleviating surpluses, but, more importantly, Public Law 480 made agriculture 
and agricultural policy essential tools of U.S. cold war foreign policy.
Public Law 480 was bom in an era of harsh cold war rhetoric and anti­
communist sentiment.4 In addition to expanding commercial markets and reducing 
surpluses, Public Law 480 was promoted as a tool to assist U.S. foreign policy. This 
point was clearly stated in the opening wording of Public Law 480:
AN ACT
To increase the consumption of United States agricultural commodities 
in foreign countries, to improve foreign relations of the United States, 
and for other purposes.5
The preamble aptly spoke to the ability “to improve foreign relations” through the use 
of food power. Conceptions of the power of food were unmistakably found in 
congressional floor debates about Public Law 480. Comments such as those by 
Democratic Congressman Brooks Hays of Arkansas, who declared that, “with proper 
use, these surpluses can be made a far more potential means of combating the spread
3 Peterson, Agricultural Exports, 69.
4 The early 1950s had borne the force o f McCarthyism, the Korean conflict, and a hardening o f the cold war. See 
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(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996), 3-19, and Walter LeFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1996, 
8th ed. (New York: MaGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 1997), 99-168.
5 Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act o f  1954, Public Law 480, United States Statutes at Large,
83rd Cong., 2nd sess. (July 10, 1954), 454.
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of communism than the hydrogen bomb,” reflected the aims and hopes of food power 
as an asset in the cold war.6 Further, the comparison of food to nuclear weapons 
starkly testified to the paramount cold war fear and rhetoric that permeated public and 
private life. Undoubtedly, Public Law 480 solidified the role of agricultural surpluses 
as a tool of foreign policy. In so doing, agricultural policy became intrinsically 
entwined with U.S. foreign policy of the cold war era -  with lasting ramifications.
Although Public Law 480 was promoted to farmers, agricultural interests, and 
the American public as a method to reduce surpluses and develop markets, it also was 
clearly meant to aid nations friendly to the United States. Peter Toma wrote in his 
book The Politics o f Foodfor Peace: Executive-Legislative Interaction, “When 
President Eisenhower signed S. 2475 into Public Law 480 on July 10, 1954, he 
commented that the legislation would ‘lay the basis for a permanent expansion of our 
exports of agricultural products, with lasting benefits to ourselves and peoples in other 
lands.’”7 Likewise, the text of Public Law 480 explicitly stated Congress’s intention 
to use the law as a means of gaining leverage against the Soviet Union by limiting its 
implementation to “friendly nations[s]” not “dominated or controlled by . . . the world 
Communist movement.”8 Democratic Congressman Fred Marshall of Minnesota 
pointedly summarized the nature of Public Law 480’s potential influence prior to its 
passage:
“I think this bill will have a great impact upon the conduct of our policy 
in foreign affairs, in that food can be used as a weapon . . . .  we [the
6 Congressional Record, 83rd Cong. 2nd sess., Vol. 100, part 6, (June 15, 1954):H8291.
7 Peter Toma, Food fo r  Peace, 41.
8 U.S. Statutes at Large, July 10, 1954, 457, sec. 107.
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United States] have never made use of food as a weapon as effectively 
as we should in this fight against the insidious effects of communism.”9
These statements testify to Public Law 480’s implications for American 
foreign policy. Though touted as a means to reduce surpluses and expand export 
markets, Public Law 480’s power resulted from its use of food as more than 
developmental and humanitarian aid. In fact, food power was used as a foreign policy 
weapon. This harmonized well with the Eisenhower administration’s desire to cut 
spending and utilize all means of deterrence. Thus, just as the Eisenhower 
administration backed away from full-scale conventional military engagement with the 
Soviet Union in its New Look policies -  through the means of catastrophic, but 
relatively inexpensive nuclear deterrence -  the use of food and economic aid presented 
another less expensive and less confrontational alternative. Food ultimately became 
an inexpensive asset in maintaining a U.S.-controlled sphere encircling and containing 
the communist world.10
9 Congressional Record, Vol. 100, part 6, (June 15, 1954): 8287.
10 Stephen Ambrose discusses Eisenhower’s New Look strategies in Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy 
Since 1938 (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 127-133. See also Walter LeFeber, America, 153-154. For insights 
into the use o f food as a cold war “instrument” see Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Food fo r  War-Food fo r  Peace: United 
States Food A id  in a Global Context, 122-129. For a discussion on containment see Melvyn P. Leffler, The Specter 
o f  Communism: The United States and the Origins o f  the Cold War 1917-1953 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 
32-63.
45
Food Aid Grants & Loans
1000
Food Aid Grants Food Aid Loans
900
800
700</)
O 600  -
2  500
^  400  -
* *  300
200
100 -
1952 1953 1954  1955  1956 1957 1958 1959 1960  1961 1962 1963 1964  1965
Year
Figure 2.1: Food Aid Grants & Loans 1952-1965 (in Historic Dollars), U.S. Agency for 
International Development, US Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook]. Dramatic increases 
in food aid occurred during this heightened cold war period. See base table in 
Appendix, Table 2.1.
“The reawakening of Underdeveloped Nations" -  Don Paarberg, Special 
Assistant to President Eisenhower11
Public Law 480 ostensibly sought not only to reduce surpluses, but also to
provide food and fiber to needy nations. However, attempting to reduce agricultural
surpluses via foreign markets was complicated by two factors. First, domestic prices
of many American farm products were not competitive with the lower world prices.
Second, overproduction created mounting surpluses, which, if dumped, could unsettle
1 9 ____.__ _both domestic and foreign markets. The Eisenhower administration’s position stated 
that the surplus situation “[required] adjustments of production in other countries, as 
well as the United States.” Moreover, the State Department felt that instead of 
destabilization, the use of Public Law 480 surpluses could provide an opportunity “to
11 Don Paarlberg, “Food for peace: Speech to Graduate School of USD A in Washington, D.C., October 7, 1959,” 
Bulletin, 41 (November 9, 1959), 672.
12 U.S. Department of State Bulletin, “Administration of Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act o f 
1954,” (Washington, D.C.: Office o f Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs), October 4, 1954, 498-502 
(499).
46
stimulate economic development in friendly countries and to strengthen their security 
position.” 13
Quickly, however, it became clear that Public Law 480 was only a limited 
means of combating the surplus situation, as potential agreements were mired in 
difficulties ranging from exchange rates to shipping methods.14 Within a year of the 
law’s implementation, the Eisenhower administration began studying the surplus 
problem more broadly. The Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal 
released the Francis report (named for Chairman Clarence Francis) in October 1955. 
The report, also entitled Prospects o f Foreign Disposal o f  Agricultural Surpluses, 
studied the entirety of surplus disposal questions, concerns, policies, and hindrances. 
The study was supposed to offer a conclusion as to the feasibility of relying on foreign 
markets as an effective outlet for relieving the surplus problem. The conclusion, 
however, was that foreign exports did not hold a great potential for achieving a large 
decrease in surplus levels.15 The study suggested that only through dramatic disasters 
would surpluses be reduced. Further, the Francis report concluded that it would take 
five years or more to liquidate the surpluses of wheat, cotton, and feed grains -  even 
with 50% more exports than the 1954-55 volume.16
Despite dismissing the impact Public Law 480 and other reduction programs 
could render on surpluses, the Francis report did conclude that the potential to utilize
13 U.S. Department o f State Bulletin, October 4, 1954, 500.
14 Peterson, Agricultural Exports, 59.
15 FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1955-1957, IX, 159-160. “Prospects o f Foreign Disposal of Agricultural 
Surpluses.” Even though exports had increased in 1954-55 and were likely to increase in the future, only with 
drastic reductions in foreign production necessitating increased imports would the U.S. be able to reduce 
substantially its own surpluses through export markets.
16U.S. State Department Bulletin, “Prospects o f Foreign Disposal o f Domestic Agricultural Surpluses,” Vol. 34,
June 18, 1956, 1019.
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agricultural surpluses in underdeveloped nations currently unable to afford U.S. 
agricultural goods existed. The real potential for using surpluses, according to the 
Francis report, was to accelerate “capital development and increase consumption 
programs.” 17 Such use was more foreign aid than export sales and was premised on 
the promise of creating a future export market. Also, such a policy required an upfront
commitment and an understanding that financial returns would be small in the short-
18term and that development would take time to accomplish. Despite the Francis 
report’s revelation that Public Law 480 would be unable to meet its goals of curbing 
surpluses, it did suggest that the legislation had potential as a tool of foreign policy 
and as an aid to development.19 The Francis report ultimately laid the foundation of 
policies later formulated into such programs as the Food for Peace initiative that used 
agricultural surpluses as investment capital.
However, some members of the administration saw the Francis report as an 
over-simplified plan regarding a rather complex issue. Undersecretary of State 
Herbert Hoover, Jr., for one, did not think that capital investments had any real chance 
of creating sustainable markets, but he did believe that a program of aid could be 
justified on humanitarian grounds. To Hoover, the report suggested that it was 
possible to substitute agricultural products for other forms of current foreign aid. The 
result would be a cost-cutting measure that would show a gross increase in total aid,
17 FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1955-1957, IX, 159-160 and U.S. State Department Bulletin June 18, 1956, 
1019.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
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but a net reduction in aid expense. Hoover’s proposal, which aimed to reduce 
overall foreign aid expenses, was amenable to the Eisenhower administration’s New 
Look philosophy of reducing expenses while maintaining effectiveness. Together, 
short-term cost reduction and long-term market development were tantalizing options 
for Eisenhower’s foreign aid strategy. Although government assistance in the form of 
price supports was not favored by President Eisenhower nor Secretary of Agriculture 
Ezra Taft Benson, the concept of market development utilizing price-supported 
surpluses was embraced.21
Dumping vs. Aid
Despite being heralded as a boon to agriculture and providing hope for foreign 
policy and budget matters, Public Law 480 initially was unsuccessful and resented.
By the time of the Eisenhower administration’s first report on Public Law 480 in 
January of 1955, the surplus situation had worsened. Export trade had decreased 30%
from 1951 to 1954, while agricultural production had increased. The result was
22government surplus commodity holdings worth in excess of $6.9 billion. Further, 
whether called foreign aid or humanitarian aid, many competing foreign and domestic
20 FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1955-1957, IX , 160-161. “Memorandum from Deputy Director o f the Office o f 
International Financial and Developmental Affairs (Tumage) to the Deputy Under Secretary o f State for Economic 
Affairs (Prochnow), Washington, November, 8, 1955.” Hoover used an example where current aid at 100 units 
could be reduced by 20% and bolstered by 100 units o f agricultural products currently held by the government, 
resulting in a gross aid package o f 180 units and a budgetary cost o f only 80 units.
21 Sarah Shaver Hughes, “Agricultural Surpluses and American Foreign Policy 1952-1960,” (master’s thesis, 
University o f Wisconsin, 1964), 52.
22 U.S. State Department Bulletin, “Activities Under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, 
Message from the President to the Congress,” Vol. 32, January 31, 1955, 202. Production data from 
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interests considered Public Law 480 “surplus dumping,” or selling commodities at less 
than the world market price.
In December of 1955, a memo to Herbert Hoover, Jr. from Thorsten Kalijarvi, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, explained the political 
ramifications of the U.S. surplus disposal policies begun under Public Law 480. 
Kalijarvi pointed to the potential for communist exploitation of the resentment created 
by the perceived U.S. dumping policy.24 In a memo from Assistant Secretary of State 
for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson to Hoover on December 8, 1955, Robertson 
explained that U.S. policy concerning rice, in particular, had pushed Burma 
increasingly into communist “arms,” and that other Southeast Asian countries, such as 
Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, were upset as well due to the perceived 
dumping by the United States that lowered the world market price for their export
25crops.
The Canadians also were critical of disposal policies. They felt the Americans
were “displacing” them from the “traditional world markets” they had long
26cultivated. In attempting to ameliorate the situation, Secretary Benson agreed to 
better consult with the Canadians about the dumping issue. But Benson also 
highlighted that Public Law 480 and the underlying domestic pressure to solve the 
surplus issue made it difficult for the United States to make necessary actions
23 Johnston, Farm Surpluses, 6.
24 FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1955-1957, IX, 164-165. “Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
o f State for Economic Affairs (Kalijarvi) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover), Washington, December 8,
1955.”
25 Ibid., 165-167. “Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the 
Under Secretary o f State (Hoover), Washington, December 8, 1955.”
26 Ibid., 154. At a joint U.S.-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs meeting, the Canadian 
delegation expressed resentment toward the U.S. disposal programs and how such actions cut into markets they had 
developed for selling their surpluses.
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agreeable to all allies. Benson’s response, asserting that domestic political pressures 
were more influential than allies’ objections to dumping policies, fostered lasting
27resentment.
Indeed, through the first two years of Public Law 480 (1954-1955), the
0 &criticisms of the program were rampant. According to Dulles, the law had left the
State Department “friendless” due primarily to grain-exporting countries wanting the 
United States to sell less of its surplus and grain-importing countries demanding more 
of the less expensive U.S. excess commodities. Moreover, the program had done little 
to develop increased foreign markets for domestic agricultural interests, and as such,
2,9had left Congress complaining that “the Executive was too cautious.”
Comparatively, in a memo at the end of December 1955, Dulles informed the 
President that the ongoing difficulties with Egypt concerning U.S. disposal of surplus 
cotton had negatively impacted U.S. relations with Egypt. As a result, Egypt had 
increased its contact with the Soviet bloc, at least in part as a response to its objections 
to U.S. cotton dumping policies.
27 FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1955-1957, IX, 154-155. “Current Economic Developments, Washington, D.C, 
October 11, 1955-1957.”
28 Ibid., 211-212. “Letter From the Chairmen of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Randall) to the Acting 
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Kalijarvi), Washington, November 27, 1955. Randall 
expressed that amendments and changes proposed to Public Law 480 should not be made, as the law itself was a 
bad law that needed to be completely done away with and replaced by new legislation.
29Toma, Politics o f  Food fo r  Peace, 56, and FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1955-1957, IX, 118, 120-121. 
“Memorandum of Discussion Between the President’s Citizen Advisers on the Mutual Security Program and the 
Secretary o f State, Washington, October 25, 1956.”
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Figure 2.2: Public Law 480 Aid, 1952-1965, U.S. Agency for International Development, 
US Overseas Loans 6 Grants [Greenbook] . Much like food, aid more generally, Public Law 
480 food aid grew spectacularly from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s. See base table 
in Appendix, Table 2.2.
The Power of Surplus
"There is no other area which our relative strength so greatly exceeds 
that of the Soviet Union as in the field of agriculture. There is the 
opportunity to make this sector, rather than some other, a major testing 
ground in our rivalry, and it is clearly in our interest to do so."30
Despite the growing resentment of Public Law 480 as a ‘dumping’ program,
the Eisenhower administration increasingly found such umbrage to be far less
dangerous than domestic budget pressures and national security. Fears of the
expanding Soviet foreign aid programs and subsequent communist expansion trumped
Public Law 480’s dumping and political liabilities.31 In addition, the Public Law 480
program (and agricultural surplus stocks in general) became a funding mechanism free
30 Don Paarlberg, “Food for Peace,” Bulletin, 61 A.
31 FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1955-1957, IX, 167. “Memorandum From the Secretary o f State (Dulles) to the 
President’s Administrative Assistant (Hauge).”
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of the Congressional oversights other forms of aid required.32 As such, Public Law
480 provided a means of aid that combated communist incursion, ostensibly
strengthened recipient nation development, and theoretically eliminated surplus
agricultural goods—all with far less regulation than other forms of economic aid. The
success of these three aspects provided benefits that overshadowed the anger and
irritation of foreign allies and domestic commercial interests and, in time, shifted the
Eisenhower administration’s view of Public Law 480 from a “temporary means of
disposal” to a “food for peace” program.33 As Peter Toma wrote in his study The
Politics o f Foodfor Peace:
After 1956, the State Department and its foreign aid agency began to 
view Public Law 480 programs as a viable instrument of foreign policy.
. . Two things emerge from this trend. The first is that Public Law 480 
was passed originally as a domestic program for the disposal of 
agricultural surpluses with only peripheral foreign aid objectives.
Many provisions were, therefore, included in the law which later 
became antithetical to the overall foreign policy objectives of the 
United States. Because of the broad allowance for administrative 
discretion in the original law, the State Department and its agencies 
took the initiative and transformed the operation of Public Law 480 
programs into an instrument of foreign aid . . . .  as a result, . . . [they] 
did not hesitate to pay lip service to the intent of the law while at the 
same time instigating changes to reduce the inherent contradictions 
involved in using a surplus disposal program for foreign aid purposes.34
Congress extended Public Law 480 legislation in 1957, 1958, and 1960, resulting in 
more funding for aid and assistance -  an unmistakable part of the Eisenhower 
administration’s foreign policy. Congress, too, clearly saw the law’s perceived
32 Peterson, Agricultural Exports, 50-69. Peterson details the implementation of Public Law 480 involving 
interdepartmental conflicts and miscommunication, but also the “complete freedom from congressional pressures.”
33 Toma, Food fo r  Peace, 58.
34 Ibid., 70-71.
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success as particularly beneficial from a political standpoint by touting its record as a 
surplus reducer (despite the lack of actual results).
As a result, Congress, which was motivated far more by domestic pressures to 
cut spending and reduce surplus than by national security interests, held a positive 
view of Public Law 480. As Congress attacked other forms of aid funding and 
blocked reduced trade controls out of fear of domestic political repercussions, 
programs such as Public Law 480 that were palatable to constituents and the budget 
alike became more important to both Congress and the administration. The outcome 
was Congressional support for Public Law 480 because of its domestic political 
success and an administrative effort to use it as an aggressive part of foreign policy 
beyond that which initially was spelled out in the legislation.
In April, the State Department commissioned a study on how American farm 
surpluses could better serve foreign policy. In a letter to a Presidential assistant, 
Secretary Benson clearly stated that the United States should look at the surplus as a 
positive rather than a negative situation. He argued that, instead of “iniquitous surplus 
disposal,” the U.S. should promote the helpful aspects such aid could bring to foreign 
policy. In an interview in U.S. News & World Report in March of 1958, Benson 
iterated some of his (and the administration’s) early views of a food for peace-type of 
program, aimed ostensibly at feeding the world’s needy. The humanitarian aspects of
35the proposal were coupled with an underlying desire to develop foreign markets. 
Although Benson recognized the negative political and commercial trade impact
35 “Feeding the W orld’s Hungry: A Cure for U.S. Farm Troubles? Interview with Ezra Taft Benson,” U.S. News & 
World Report 44 (March 14, 1958): 68-72.
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inherent in utilizing food aid, he nevertheless was steadfast in promoting the potential 
of food as a tool of foreign policy.
In particular, the efficiency of U.S. agriculture was a positive selling tool to 
underdeveloped nations, and it was hoped that technological assistance could provide 
substantial benefits to developing the underdeveloped world markets. Benson also 
advocated the development of other markets, particularly those within the Soviet bloc. 
Benson, like the President, favored development of any market available -  even 
though this view was not supported by many hard-line, anti-communist bureaucrats.36 
Benson’s rhetoric does not show a fundamental shift in policy; rather, his statements 
show an acceptance of agriculture’s role in foreign policy.
By the summer of 1958, Benson advanced to the Council on Foreign Economic 
Policy (CFEP) the idea of calling an international conference concerning “food for 
peace.” Though the council felt that it was not an appropriate time for such a 
conference, they did agree that the use of food surpluses had foreign policy value. At 
this meeting, Benson clearly outlined that such a conference would assert the United 
States’ generosity and make use of “our greatest advantage over the Soviet Union, 
which is in the field of Agriculture.”37 In January of 1959, Eisenhower directed 
Benson to testify before Congress on the need to use the surpluses of the United States 
and other nations in efforts to support peace. The Eisenhower administration had 
clearly chosen to emphasize the humanitarian aspects of foreign assistance, which 
were recognized as invaluable propaganda tools for U.S. foreign policy. Thus, though
36 “Feeding the W orld’s Hungry,” U.S. News & World Report, 70-71.
37 FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1958-1960, IV, 173-174. “Minutes o f the 76lh Meeting o f the Council on 
Foreign Economic Policy, July 8, 1958.”
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the food for peace concept was indeed a feed-the-hungry-and-needy campaign, it also
-) o
was a counter to Soviet aid packages.
The perceived threat of Sino-Soviet economic policy on the underdeveloped 
world had garnered the complete attention of the Eisenhower administration. As such, 
programs that could be used to confront communist aid were beneficial. Moreover, as 
previously indicated, a food for peace program contrasted with U.S. aid programs tied 
more directly to military arrangements.39 As a result, Public Law 480 was rebranded 
from a surplus reduction program to a food for peace humanitarian endeavor. Despite 
the rhetoric, the contradictions of Public Law 480 remained.
In testimony before the House Committee on Agriculture in July of 1959, 
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Thomas C. Mann testified to the 
contradictions of surplus disposal and its growing part in U.S. foreign policy. Mann 
relayed that, although the program provided food to the recipient nation and created a 
market for surplus goods, it also frequently hindered the self-sufficiency efforts of the 
host country and cannibalized commercial domestic and allied exports.40 U.S. policy 
had long attempted to balance between these two positions. Increasingly, however, 
agricultural surpluses were used as both carrot and stick, so to speak. If a country 
were in need, the food could be a boon; likewise, U.S. commodities could be withheld 
if that country did not meet U.S. terms.
38 FRUS: Foreign Economic Policy 1958-1960, IV, 194-195. “Telegram from the Department o f State to the 
Embassy in Australia, February 9, 1959, 9:15 p.m.” The telegram sent by Dulles has enclosed the text o f a letter 
from Eisenhower to Benson. The Eisenhower administration became increasingly dependent on aid as a strategy of 
foreign policy. Thus, Benson was directed to lead the effort to organize a food for peace project in close 
cooperation with the Department o f State as well as allied nations.
39 FRUS: Foreign A id  1955-1957, X, 28-30.
40 U.S. Department o f State Bulletin, “Department’s Views on Administration of Public Law 480,” Vol. 41, August 
10, 1959,212-215.
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Moreover, the United States could use its agricultural might to influence world 
market prices. As such, Mann stated, “At times, market stability and the attitudes of 
other exporting nations are governed not so much by what we actually do in 
administering our disposal program but what they fear we might do.” Though it was 
the United States’ responsibility to act in a sound manner, Mann stressed that the 
threat of market manipulation could not be overlooked as a valuable tool of foreign 
policy. As Mann concluded, “Public Law 480 has, on balance, made a constructive 
contribution to our foreign policy as well as our national objectives. It can continue to 
do so if we continue to administer it in such a way as to serve our broad interests and 
those of the free world.”41 Mann’s comments revealed that, beneath the rhetoric of 
food for peace and humanitarian aid, the program remained an important lever for 
U.S. interests. The food for peace plan, though certainly meant to help those in need 
and to develop a more interconnected world, also was meant to promote U.S. values 
and interests. It was not merely an altruistic vehicle for the distribution of food 
surplus.
A speech by Don Paarlberg, Special Assistant to the President, highlighted the 
dynamic nature of food aid in foreign policy. According to Paarlberg, agriculture had 
entered the “international age,” and food aid served as a catalyst in “the reawakening 
of Underdeveloped Nations.” Despite Paarlberg’s eloquent flourish, he went on to 
describe the real impetus beyond food aid, which was to stake out positions of 
geopolitical significance against the Soviet menace. Paarlberg stated:
41 U.S. Department o f Statq Bulletin, August 10, 1959, 212-215.
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Not simply do the people in the less developed countries aspire to 
economic advancement; also there is intense and growing rivalry 
between the free world and the Communist bloc in assisting these 
people to attain the goals to which they aspire and, in the case of the 
Communist effort, some additional goals to which the people do not 
aspire. This rivalry springs from the fact that many governments in 
the less developed parts of the world, in their pursuit of economic 
betterment, hesitate between the free and the authoritarian route.42
Clearly, according to Paarlberg, the direct confrontation between the United States and 
the Soviet Union in post World War II Europe had, by the late fifties, shifted to “less 
developed areas.” The rivalry was not so much intended to assist underdeveloped 
nations in attaining “goals to which they aspire,” but rather to construct linkage to a 
particular “sphere of influence.” In fact, Paarlberg related that “most people would 
agree that this form of rivalry is superior to an arms race. But let us not be deluded. It 
is a more subtle, softer, longer range, but no less meaningful contest.”43 In spite of 
Paarlberg’s effort to promote a humanitarian program of food aid, his words instead 
hint at the growing economic and military game of Monopoly™ between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, in which the underdeveloped world merely became 
properties on the game board. Public Law 480-Food for Peace, and agricultural aid, 
more generally, was a means to secure assets for the United States.
Indeed, the rivalry of giving economic aid to the underdeveloped world -  
though not as dramatic as the arms race -  was a very relevant aspect of the cold war. 
Although preferable to an arms race in terms of potential catastrophe, it was no less 
exploitative of peoples and nations in the race for geopolitical advantage due to the
42 Bulletin, November 9, 1959, 672-673.
43 Ibid., 673.
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destabilizing influence on domestic economies and the dependencies it created. Faced 
with concerns over budget, the Eisenhower administration looked to alternative 
methods of battling Soviet aggression. Agricultural surpluses were one alternative. 
Although passed initially as a means of assisting with the reduction of surplus 
agricultural goods, Public Law 480 evolved under the influence of the cold war 
atmosphere of the 1950s. Eventually, the Eisenhower administration realized the 
benefits of agricultural aid as a tool of foreign policy and moved to fully exercise this 
advantage over the Soviet Union. As a result, both domestic politics and the impetus 
to greatly change the overproduction and subsidization issues within U.S. agriculture 
became secondary concerns to national security interests.
Conclusion
From the beginning, Public Law 480 suffered from the existence of inherent 
contradictions. First, Congress hoped to maintain farm income and bring crop 
production in line with demand. However, this only was possible if market prices 
increased or farmers raised less. Politically, increasing commodity market prices (and, 
in turn, the price of food) was not a favorable option to politicians from larger urban 
and suburban areas. Moreover, decreasing production likely required the removal of 
labor from agriculture—a concept unpalatable to many in Congress and the nation.44 
Essentially, because of these concerns, it became next to impossible to maintain farm 
income without government support. In addition, the term “disposal” had detrimental
44 Willard W. Cochrane and C. Ford Runge, Reforming Farm Policy: Toward a National Agenda, (Ames: Iowa 
State University Press, 1992), 27. Cochrane and Runge stated that misconceptions about farming and rural life and 
desires to “save the family farm” contributed to the inability o f urban representatives in Congress to construct 
meaningful legislation. See also Toma, Food for Peace, 1-7 for an overview of Congressional hesitance of 
reducing farm labor.
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connotations to commercial interests and allies and hindered the effort to foster export
markets. Although the text of Public Law 480 avoids the term “disposal,” both 
Congress and the rest of the world saw the policy as a means of disposing of U.S. 
commodities by exploiting world demand.45 Other exporting nations decried the 
perceived U.S. intent to discharge its agricultural surpluses as creating a glut on the 
world market. Contrary to the goal of creating and building foreign friendships, the 
‘benefits’ of using U.S. surpluses through Public Law 480, in fact, undercut some U.S. 
interests.46
Likewise, using Public Law 480 to stimulate export market demand was 
misguided by humanitarian sympathies that focused on the idea that the United States 
had an abundance of food while other places in the world were hungry. However, this 
notion failed to fully consider that the hungry of the world could not afford to 
purchase these American foodstuffs at market prices.47 Despite the popular belief in 
the United States’ duty to feed the hungry of the world, humanitarian aid, itself, did 
little to expand commercial export markets and certainly did not maintain farm
48income. In the end, Public Law 480, like the agricultural policy of which it was a
45 See Robert L. Paarlberg, Food Trade and Foreign Policy: India, the Soviet Union, and the United States. (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1985), 109-111. Paarlberg noted that Public Law 480 caused “displeasure . . . among 
other agricultural exporters, including some important U.S. security allies.” Further, Congress was unable to 
dispose o f foreign currency proceeds.
46 See Paarlberg, Food Trade and Foreign Policy, 111, as well as Peterson, Agricultural Exports, 91.
47 Frances Moore Lappe, Joseph Collins and David Kinley, A id  as Obstacle: Twenty Questions about our Foreign 
A id  and the Hungry (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1980) 9-14. Lappe, Collins, and 
Kinley provided a quick overview of why food aid failed, namely because the needy lacked power. As a result, aid 
tended to hurt as much as it helped by maintaining a power relationship in which the needy were unable to 
overcome.
48 See floor debates in Congressional Record, 83rd Congress., Vol. 100, part. 6, June 15, 1954. Paarlberg, Food  
Trade, 109. Paarlberg explained that many aid markets never developed into dollar markets; instead, markets in 
Eastern Europe banned from Public Law 480 sales did become dollar markets. Also, Norval Matzner, interview, 20 
November 2001 and Dan Anderson, questionnaire by author, Balaton, MN and Williamsburg, VA 16 December 
2001. Both Matzner and Anderson attested in interviews that many farmers were strong proponents of the 
American ability to feed the hungry o f the world.
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part, failed to have any meaningful effect on U.S. agricultural surpluses because it had 
no way of addressing the root problem -  overproduction.
In spite of criticism from allies and bureaucrats, Public Law 480 did lay the 
foundation for agriculture to become a very integral part of foreign policy and 
influenced U.S. agricultural policy in important ways. Ultimately, difficulties in 
Public Law 480 administration, criticism from allies, and failed surplus reduction were 
outweighed by the aid flexibility Public Law 480 provided. And more importantly, 
the surpluses, themselves, represented a symbol of U.S. power that aided national 
security. Food could be used as a trade lever, a diplomatic lever, a humanitarian gift, a 
developmental loan -  all of which were valuable -  but the insurance of the surplus 
stockpile in the cold war was, in the end, indispensable.
Specters, Subsidies, Surpluses, and Bleeder Valves
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The Hardship of Bounty
American grain farmers in the 1950s were confronted with a number of 
pressures. Despite price supports and subsidies, farmers remained caught in a cost- 
price squeeze: low crop prices and rising production costs.1 Increased government 
regulation in the form of subsidies and quotas left farmers wondering what had 
happened to the concept of a free market. In addition, a technological revolution 
involving improved farming methods, genetic and other scientific breakthroughs, and 
efficiencies of machinery and power was in full progress. Neither were farmers 
immune from the fears of the Soviet Union, communism, and nuclear Armageddon. 
Just as the post-World War II era and the cold war changed American social, 
economic, and political life, so too did it come to have ever-greater influence over 
American agriculture. It is plain to see that agriculture (and thereby, farmers) were an 
increasingly important part of foreign policy during the 1950s and 1960s. Yet, it is 
less clear how farmers viewed their role in the cold war struggle given the many other 
pressures they faced.
Following the catastrophe of the Depression and the Dust Bowl, American 
agriculture met the challenge and mammoth demand necessitated by World War II.
1 “Are Farmers Really Going Broke?” U.S. News & World Report, 40 (March 16 1956): 146. Article details the 
pressures o f increased debt. See also “Who is Hurting Most and W hy?” Farm Journal, 80, (April 1956): 18. 
Article explains that total farm income is down 5%, and prices down, as well. Further, increased costs (gas from 
$0.19 to $0,215, tractors $2450 to $3600) exacerbate the problem (23). Another source is “Farmers— Everyone’s 
Headache Again” Business Week, (July 18, 1953): 29.
2 Cochrane and Runge, Reforming, 3. See also “Harvest More Com,” Farm Journal, 77 (September 1953): 32-33. 
Also, Don Paarlberg and Philip Paarlberg, The Agricultural Revolution o f  the 20th Century. (Ames: Iowa State 
University Press, 2000), xv, 22-26, 44. Discussions ranging from DNA to mral electrification to soil conservation 
to machinery innovations are covered in this work.
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Buoyed by the virtually unlimited needs of world war, American farmers and the 
agricultural industry as a whole brought to bear the technological sophistication and 
human effort that in no small way helped propel the allies to victory. Demand for 
agricultural goods after World War II subsided only briefly; soon, calls to support and 
rebuild Europe and Asia reignited demand for U.S. agricultural production. By late 
1948, demand was decreasing, but the pressures of World War II and the initial post­
war reconstruction had primed an agricultural engine not easily throttled back.4 
Despite renewed demand due to the Korean conflict, by 1952-1953 overproduction 
and the surplus it created once again became political and budgetary issues -  with 
farmers taking no small measure of the public blame.5
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4 “Prices Down, Down: Midwest Apprehension,” Newsweek, 41 (February 23 1953): 24-26, 99.
5 “High Costs, Low Prices,” Newsweek 68 (June 22 1953): 68. “The longtime acceptance o f the theory that 
whatever problem the farmer has he can look to the government to solve it.” Also see Toma, F oodfor Peace, 7. 
The “general public objected to being forced to subsidize agriculture for ‘useless’ production.”
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However, while concerns over the United States’ cornucopia of food reached a 
feverish pitch, the growing “specter of communism” fueled an atmosphere in which 
the policies responsible for the surplus problem were subtly continued.6 Even while 
politicians and pundits denounced agricultural policy and farmer subsidization, 
farmers were pressured daily by U.S. agricultural policy and the agricultural industry 
to continue a trend toward bigger, better, faster, and more efficient farms and farm 
technologies. From government-sponsored research and publications promoting the 
need to “Break Through Ceilings” and “[Breed] Better Hogs” to industry news 
emphasizing “harvest more, quickly” to industrial marketing presenting the need for 
the power, speed, and efficiency of the newest and best farm equipment, farmers were
• 7confronted on all fronts with the need to expand and improve their farm operations.
Many farmers chose to increase their debt in order to 
meet these demands.8 In the end, these pressures played a 
supporting role in fueling an era of hyper-competitiveness.
All the while, cold war concerns and divided opinions 
hindered an effective adjustment to agricultural policy in 
order to curb production. In the end, the cold war 
substantiated the historic policy of agricultural subsidization
6 See Melvyn P. Leffler, The Specter o f  Communism: The United States and the Origins o f  the Cold War 1917- 
1953. The title o f Leffler’s study speaks to the fear o f communism in the United States.
7 Toma, Food fo r  Peace, 15. Also, R. Anderson, “Harvest More Com,” Farm Journal, 77 (September 1 1953): 32- 
33. “We Must Break Through Ceilings” (production ceilings), “Our Cows are Heftier Today,” and “A Plan for 
Breeding Better Hogs,” Agricultural Research, January-February 1953, 3; August 1955, 13; March 1957, 13. See 
John Deere Day 1959/60, produced by John Deere & Co. directed by Ried H. Ray, 97 min., John Deere Films,
1991, videocassette.
8 “Are Farm er’s Really Going Broke?” U.S. News & World Report, 40 (March 16 1956): 146. “Farmers owe close 
to 10 billion dollars in loans for such things as equipment, seed, fertilizer, and personal needs. That is more than 
double the figure for 1940.”
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that has grown into a welfare system for agriculture still in existence today.
Within this pressure-filled environment to produce more, more efficiently, the 
viewpoint of the individual farmers takes on added importance. There is an 
abundance of information regarding agricultural policy during the cold war -  with 
disparate viewpoints. Much of this information focuses on the views of leaders in 
government, agricultural organizations, and agri-business. Amidst this cacophony, the 
voice of individual family farmers often is drowned out.9 Farm magazines and 
newspaper publications provide some interviews, polls, and statistics regarding 
farmers’ views, but frequently they seem to address specific questions or are the 
expressions of only one or two producers. In order to gamer a more well-rounded 
understanding of how the cold war affected farmers, it becomes necessary to 
accumulate some documentation from farmers, themselves. Obviously, this effort is 
fraught with some difficulty, and such a sampling has the usual impediments of 
memory, subjectivity, and age. Farmers of this generation are growing fewer each 
day. Thus, for the purposes of providing additional understanding of farming during 
the cold war and the view of the cold war’s effect on farming, a brief survey of 
farmers and rural businessmen in Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, and South Dakota was 
conducted.10 The goal of the survey was simply to lend a farmer’s voice to the issues
9 See Bruce Field, Harvest o f  Dissent: The National Farmers Union and the Early Cold War, (Lawrence, Kansas: 
University Press of Kansas, 1998), 145-160, for a discussion o f regional disputes in the National Farmer’s Unions. 
Also Hughes, “Agricultural Surpluses and American Foreign Policy 1952-1960,” 14-19, examines the divergent 
views within the American Farm Bureau Federation.
10 This four-state region was chosen because of its statistical abnormalities as well as a personal connection. 
Another reason, as written in Cochran and Runge, Reforming Farm Policy, 20, was the quote that the “upper 
Midwest is a blank on the mental maps of most Americans.” The forty farmers surveyed were selected from 
suggestions made by personal contacts in these area.
65
of surplus, confused agricultural policy, and the cold war.11 (Further detail on the 
survey, hereafter referred to as Farm Survey, can be found in the Appendix page 80.)
Food Shield
American life changed dramatically after World War II. Growing prosperity, 
technological conveniences such as television and airline travel, and an interstate 
highway system were just a few of the factors transforming American society in 
dramatic ways. Despite such progress, growing urban populations, as well as their 
rural counterparts, were confronted with the same communist fears and suspicions. 
Bomb shelters, nuclear fall-out, and McCarthyism permeated American life, causing 
varying, yet unmistakable effects. Americans of all classes felt the influences of the 
cold war throughout their daily existence.
The tensions on the fabric of American life during the cold war have been the 
grounds for studies such as Elaine Tyler May’s Homeward Bound and for memoirs 
such as David Beers’s Blue Sky Dream. Both works emphasized the cold war’s far-
reaching bearing on not just lives, but also American life. May investigated how the
12.cold war touched family life, gender roles, and social norms throughout America. 
Beers reflected on his adult realization that the “perfect” American childhood was
11 See Farm Survey, Appendix, p. 80.
12 See Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era  (New York: Basic Books, 
1988). M ay’s work based on first-hand interviews and research surveys (particularly the “Kelly Longitudinal 
Survey”) detailed the dysfunction and vicissitudes o f American families during the 1950s. Collective cold war 
societal fears demanded strong families willing to stay together in a metaphoric example o f security against 
communist perversion. Under this shroud o f familial containment, however, hid a host o f problems that often later 
erupted. According to May, the cold war promoted a reversion in familial life to much stricter gender roles, wiping 
away a tide o f feminist progress from the 1920s, 1930s, and World War II. May asserted that a strong family, 
utilizing a form of “domestic containment,” that involved clear gender roles as well as a clear husband-wife-child 
hierarchy, could avoid the pitfalls o f communist subversion such as homosexual behavior, sexual perversion, and 
non-conformity. Cold war anxieties promoted these “strategies” of home-life security.
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very much a product of the cold war. Beers realized that the aerospace industry (by 
which his father was employed) was essentially an industry surviving from a U.S. 
military-funded welfare program.13 Both works highlighted the depth to which 1950s 
America was held captive by the United States’ ever-present standoff with the 
communist world. And, farmers and their families were not immune to these 
pressures.
Although Beers’s depiction of a government-subsidized aerospace program 
may appear to have little in common with the agricultural industry, in fact, such 
subsidization was very comparable to the support programs constructed for the 
American farmer. Just as the government subsidization of the aerospace industry 
existed in order to battle the Soviet Union’s air and space endeavors, so too did the 
support program for farmers seek to defeat communist agricultural production. While 
the aerospace industry created missiles, farmers raised food. But, in the cold war, both 
were vitally important weapons.
Likewise, just as the aerospace and technology industries constructed an 
overabundance of weaponry and a nuclear arsenal that could destroy the world many 
times over, the agricultural industry grew an overabundance of food to feed the nation 
and the world’s needy. In both cases, the government subsidized overproduction as a 
symbol of America’s bounty and power. Surpluses, whether of weaponry or food, 
represented the symbols of power deemed necessary to confront, intimidate, and 
contain the Soviet Union. This armaments race fueled the need to become bigger,
13 David Beers, Blue Sky Dream: A Memoir o f  A m erica’s Fall from  Grace (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & 
Company, 1996).
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better, and faster -  not only in the aerospace industry, but also in the farming industry. 
Thus, just as the military-industrial complex sustained the defense and aerospace 
industry, U.S. agriculture subsisted through a similar, if unnamed, military-agricultural 
complex of its own. Moreover, both epitomized a state-supported welfare system that 
was fueled by the fear of communism and the perceived need to project U.S. power at 
any cost.
The thought of the American farmer on the government ‘dole’ may seem 
offensive to farmers and quite possibly Americans in general.14 Indeed, the idea of a 
welfare system for agriculture is a difficult subject to broach with a farmer. However, 
when asked, Farm Survey respondents’ frustration with agricultural policy resonated 
with the following statement: “U.S. agricultural policy essentially has created a 
support system farmers have become dependent upon for survival.” Eighty-six 
percent of farmers felt that, indeed, agricultural policy had made them dependent on 
subsidies.15 Even farmers recognized their own dependency on agricultural policy, 
but did they see a connection to the cold war?
As noted, 1950s America was indelibly marked by the cold war. American 
power and prestige around the world reached levels heretofore unknown, leaving some 
to suggest the late 1950s represented the height of American hegemony.16 Whether
14 Ingolf Vogeler, The Myth o f  the Family Farm: Agribusiness Dominance o f  U.S. Agriculture (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1981), 3-6. Vogeler studied the myth of the family farm and documents the social and political 
acceptance of the family farm ideal. Vogeler related that the “appeal o f the family farm has become stronger as the 
number o f farms has decreased.” See also Toma, Food fo r  Peace, 1-7. The whimsical fascination with the 
American independent farmer as a symbol o f American freedom, ingenuity, work ethic, and liberty was examined 
by Toma in his book on the Food for Peace program.
15 Farm Survey, Question 28, “Do you agree with statement: ‘U.S. agricultural policy essentially has created a 
support system farmers have become dependent upon for survival.’”
16 Thomas McCormick, Am erica’s H a lf Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After, 2nd ed. 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 125. McCormick’s definition of hegemony focused on the
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intended or not, America’s wielding of hegemonic power increasingly led to policies 
that were imperial in spirit, if not in word. The power of America as an imperial 
nation was unleashed in a variety of ways. Covert operations, police actions, military 
interventions, political subversion, and food aid were all parts of an increasingly 
complex set of tools available to ‘improve’ our foreign interests. The use of food as a 
deterrent and developmental tool within U.S. foreign policy was solidified during the 
1950s. Hence, an attempt to understand farmers’ perceptions of their role as foreign 
policy assets, heretofore rarely documented, is important in framing a full-scale view 
of cold war policy.
“Get big or get out” -  Earl Butz, former Secretary of Agriculture17
The lasting effects of this era of policy dysfunction can be seen most readily in 
the increased specialization of farms, the ever-expanding individual farm size, and the 
ever-decreasing number of farmers.18 At its essence, agricultural policy’s welfare 
system acted like a bleeder valve for U.S. agriculture. By slowly culling the least 
efficient (and generally the smallest) farmers from the agricultural labor pool, U.S. 
policy gradually moved the excess labor out of the agricultural sector. But the policy 
did not limit production; it only increased it! Although reductions in farm labor may 
have been necessary in order to eliminate surplus production, U.S. agricultural policy 
was hardly motivated toward balancing production with demand. Instead, U.S.
world market system in which the U.S. was a participant. According to McCormick, by the late 1950s the United 
States was able to use its power to “realize some approximation of its preferred world order.”
17 Cochrane and Runge, Reforming Farm Policy, 21. Comment attributed to Earl Butz, President N ixon’s Secretary 
o f Agriculture.
18 Ibid., 4. This is defined by Cochrane and Runge as “resource concentration.”
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agricultural policy did little to hinder run-away production. Ultimately, misguided and 
outdated agricultural policy fostered increased farmer dependence on subsidization 
and made farming a more capital-intensive industry. Moreover, the farm industry 
shifted to increasingly specialized agricultural production. Likewise, Farm Survey 
responses consistently pointed to the pressure to expand, which greatly influenced the 
move toward specialization. In fact, more than 80% of survey respondents answered 
affirmatively to a question asking specifically if farmers had become more dependent 
on fewer crops.19
In the 1950s, the concerns of overproduction, low farm income, and rising cost 
-  the “cost-price squeeze” -  existed throughout agricultural and political discourse. In 
comparison to the overall U.S. economy, which was growing robustly, the farm sector 
was lagging well behind.20 In 1956 Farm Journal published an article detailing the 
problems faced by farmers. Small farmers, in particular, were feeling pinched. One 
reason for apprehension was the increasing cost of farming. Despite rising production, 
profitability was lagging. One particularly telling quote stated: “We buy our living on 
farms today. Twenty-five years ago our dads used to produce it right on the farm.”
The quote expressed the increased dependence on processed food and goods, new 
equipment, and financing rather than self-sufficient production.21 The nature of 
farming had changed from diverse and self-sufficient farms to a non-diverse, specialist 
industry.
19 Farm Survey, Question 7, “Do you think farmers have become more dependent on fewer crops or livestock in the 
last half-century?” Based on 19 of 23 responses to the question (unanswered responses were not counted).
20 John Bird, “Our Out-of-Balance Agriculture,” Country Gentleman, 123 (December 1953): 23, 54-57. Bird 
examined the issues associated with the floundering agricultural situation.
21 “Who is Hurting Most and Why?” Farm Journal, 80 (April 1956): 22-23.
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ICom parison of P rinciple C rops
Average 1941-50 to Average 1951-60, 11 prinlcple crops oflA , MN, NE, & SD
Average Acres planted 1941-1950 (In Thousands of acres)
■ ■
P'v
U.S. Total 50,308 4,412 417 88,379 43,968 13,986 14,357 833 4,283 13,655 74,536 309,134 89.7% 344,756
Iowa 208 14 - 10,629 5,691 68 26 3 150 1,786 3,420 21,995 6.4%
Minnesota 1,182 171 42 5,386 4,834 1,150 17 39 1,392 654 4,257 19,124 5.5%
Nebraska 3,540 329 - 7,737 2,428 1,708 585 62 37 4,216 20,642 6.0%
South Dakota 3,323 73 4 3,826 3,014 1,060 468 7 503 29 3,694 16,001 4.6%
Total IA, MN, NE. SD 8,253 587 46 27,578 15,967 3,986 1,096 110 2,045 2,506 15,587 77,761 22.6%
Average Acres planted 1951-1960 (in T housands of acres)
U.S. Total 63,509 4,104 136 79,901 41,136 14,034 17,644 865 4,525 20,536 72,216 318,606 97.5% 326,844
Iowa 165 36 - 10,977 5,563 26 117 1 25 2,280 3,772 22,962 7.0%
Minnesota 900 122 - 5,924 4,639 1,074 - 71 900 2,090 3,722 19,442 5.9%
Nebraska 3,812 281 - 6,513 2,002 263 1,180 62 148 5,265 19,526 6.0%
South Dakota 2,970 302 - 4,084 3,492 595 240 5 732 160 5,190 17,771 5.4%
Total IA, MN, NE, SD 7,847 741 - 27,499 15,696 1,958 1,537 139 1,657 4,678 17,949 79,701 24.4%
Source: USDA, Agricultural Statistics, 1936-1965
* Includes the 59 principle crops planted within the United State
Figure 3.4 Comparison of Principle U.S. Crops, Average 1941-1950 to Average 1951-60, 
USDA, Agricultural Statistics. Despite an overall decrease in planted acres, the 
percentage share of the 59 principle crops increased from 89.7% to 97.5%, evidence of 
the reliance upon fewer crops nationwide.
Another concern was the need to expand to stay competitive, and, thereby, the
22underlying intensive capital investment necessary to do so. To meet capital 
requirements, or just to survive, some farmers took second jobs off the farm in order to 
augment their farm income. Others opted for debt and financed their expansion (see 
Figure 3.5). A wheat farmer described the need to expand by stating: “I was farming 
only 500 acres when this thing started but I jumped it to 1,200. High prices may
23encourage me to grow more bushels but low prices force me to grow ‘em.” Indeed, 
many farmers attempted to overcome low prices by increasing production. In fact,
78% of Farm Survey respondents answered that they remembered large agribusiness 
entities and the USDA promoting products and technology aimed at increasing
22 “Who is Hurting Most and W hy,” Farm Journal, 22-23.
23 Ibid., 23.
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productivity and yields.24 Expansion of cultivated acres was the easiest means of 
doing so. In addition to outright expansion, the onset of better fertilizer, farm 
techniques, and hybrids made it possible to raise more on fewer acres. Or, a farmer 
could shift acres into production of another subsidized crop. Ultimately, such
25decisions further fueled the cycle of overproduction and lower prices.
Total Farm-mortgage debt (in 1,000 dollars)
20 , 000,000
18 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
-♦— Total Fa rm -m o rtg ag e  d e b t (in 1,000 do llars)
16 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
12 , 000,000
10, 000,000
1, 000,000
6 , 000,000
4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
2 , 000,000
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957  1958 1959 1960  1961 1962 1963  1964  1965
F i g u r e  3 . 5 :  T o t a l  F a r m - M o r t g a g e  D e b t ,  1 9 4 9 - 1 9 6 5 ,  USDA, A g r i c u l t u r a l  S t a t i s t i c s .  Farm  
m o r t g a g e  d e b t  m o r e  t h a n  d o u b l e d  b e t w e e n  1 9 5 0  a n d  1 9 6 0  a s  f a r m e r s  u t i l i z e d  d e b t  
f i n a n c i n g  i n  o r d e r  t o  e x p a n d  a n d  r e m a i n  c o m p e t i t i v e . S e e  A p p e n d i x  T a b l e  3 . 3  f o r  
d e t a i l .
24 F arm  Survey, Question 25a, “Thinking back to the 1950s and 1960s, do you recall seeing large agricultural 
businesses (such as International Harvester, John Deere, Cargill) and the USDA promoting products and 
technology aimed at increasing power, efficiency, and yields?” And, John Deere Day 1959/60, produced by John 
Deere & Co. directed by Ried H. Ray, 97 min., John Deere Films, 1991, videocassette. This annual event featured 
John Deere’s marketing o f its new product lines with emphasis on speed, power, and ease. Further examples of 
agricultural industry marketing pressure can be found in Wayne G Broehl Jr., John D eere’s Company: A History o f  
Deere & Company and Its Times (Moline: Double Day & Company Inc, 1984), 612. One example is a 1960 
advertisement “Announcing a NEW GENERATION of Power” on a brochure introducing new line o f four- and 
six-cylinder tractors, 1960 (See Image 3.1).
25 Bird, “Out-of-Balance,” 23. Even as farm prices fell between 1930-1932, total harvested acreage increased. The 
farmer response, as an individual entity, was to compete against his/her neighbor.
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Beyond the downward spiral of overproduction and falling prices, expansion 
exacerbated differences between farmers by firmly placing farmers against one 
another as independent entities rather than as an organized lobby (a problem further 
magnified by the lack of cohesiveness amongst farm organizations).26 These factors 
contributed to 72% of Farm Survey respondents viewing agricultural policy as 
“forcing farmers to compete against each other.”27 Despite the general agreement 
when answering this question, a subsequent question asking farmers which factors 
were most to blame for the problems in U.S. agriculture during the 1950s and 1960s 
once again proved divisive. Farmers pointed to politics, revolutionary agricultural 
technology, overzealous farmers, and unsound agricultural policy as possible 
contributors to the problems in agriculture.28 Interestingly, less than five percent of 
the answers pointed to the cold war as being a factor. In fact, 37% of farmers did not 
think the cold war had diverted interest, money, or support from programs intended to
9Qalleviate the plight of farmers.
The incentives of specialization outweighed the negatives on a per farmer 
basis. The result was increased production (and surplus) -  despite the loss of farm 
labor (see Figure 3.3). Surpluses also grew because farmers were unwilling to submit
26 See Samuel R. Berger, Dollar Harvest: The Story o f  the Farm Bureau, (Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath 
Lexington Books, 1971), 179. Throughout, Berger explained the dysfunction and corruption o f the Farm Bureau, 
one powerful farm interest lobby, but Berger also explained the fragmented nature of all groups in general. See 
also Cochrane and Runge, Reforming Farm Policy, 22. They termed the pressure to expand as forcing 
“cannibalization o f the small by big.”
27 Farm Survey, Question 26, “Did you see agricultural policy as forcing farmers to compete against each other?”
28 Farm Survey, Question 29, “In your opinion, which of the following factors is most to blame for the problems in 
U.S. agriculture during the 1950s and 1960s? Check no more than two:”
29 Farm Survey, Question 18, “Did you think the cold war diverted interest, money, and support from the plight of 
farmers and rural America?” 27 respondents, 12 yes, 10 no, 5 no opinion. See Question 12, page 23. These results 
reflect closely the responses farmers gave when asked how they felt the cold war affected them.
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to acreage allotments and other production curbing policies.30 At fault was an 
agricultural policy that preferred the costs of subsidization to the costs of political 
rancor. The formulation of this agricultural policy arose as well from domestic 
political and economic concerns and the intensifying conflicts of the cold war.31
# of Farm Workers and Value of Farm Production
60,000,000
W orkers
V alue o f agricultural s e c to r  production (in th o u sa n d s)
50,000,000
40 ,000,000
30,000,000
20 ,000,000
10,000,000
0
1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
Figure 3 . 3 .  Number of Farm Workers and Value of Farm Production 1 9 2 0 - 1 9 7 0 ,  
www. u s d a .gov/nass/ & w w w . e r s . u s d a . g o v / . See Appendix Table 3 . 2  for detail.
“Farming the Government” -  Norval Matzner, Farmer32
The phrase “farming the government” arose from the ability of a farmer to take 
advantage of agricultural policy through the exploitation of price guarantees and 
subsidies. For example, if a farmer violated acreage allotment restrictions and paid 
resulting fines for two years, the farmer’s acreage allotment would increase the third
30 “How our Readers Voted,” Farm Journal, 82 (February 1958): 14. And New York Times, November 23, 25-21, 
1958 and January 28, 1959.
31 Lauren Soth, An Embarrassment o f  Plenty, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1834), 4.
32 Norval Matzner, interview by author, November 20, 2001, telephone conversation. Matzner recalled this 
common jocular saying that referred to fanners’ exploitation o f the U.S. government price support program in the 
late 1950s and through the 1960s.
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year. This was due to a loophole in allotment policy that allowed farmers to base their 
acreage allocation on their previous two years of total farmed acres. As a result, 
farmers increased their subsidized acres. The choice between production-curbing 
subsidies offered by the U.S. government farm programs or attempting to “farm the 
government” by opting out of the farm program and increasing production to take 
advantage of subsidized prices was ever-present in the 1950s and 1960s. The two 
options stood in marked contrast. The subsidization approach was supported by 
advocates of the rural ideal, in which a farmer class should be made up of many 
independent small farmers. In contrast, others began to advocate a streamlined, 
efficient agricultural sector that would move the excess labor in agriculture into the 
industrial sector.33 These two positions placed farmers in a quandary. The 
increasingly complex agricultural policy forced farmers to choose between adhering to 
production and marketing quotas or trying to benefit from violating them in order to 
expand their farms.34
This predicament was exemplified in a 1959 LIFE interview entitled “A 
Skilled Grower’s Fat Surplus” with Iowa farmer W.J. Breckenridge of Dinsdale, Iowa. 
The article stated, “Breckenridge tells what he thinks of a farm program that 
encourages him and many others to join the run-away production and cash in on the 
subsidy.”35 Further, Breckenridge alluded to the complex nature of agricultural policy 
by declaring, “Farmers must operate by constantly shifting rules laid down by
33 Hughes, “Agricultural Surpluses and American Foreign Policy 1952-1960,” 7-20. Hughes discussed what she 
terms as the “high price support” versus “world competitive” groups.
34 Toma, Food for Peace, 6-15. Toma detailed production controls and mentioned that individual farmers could 
maximize profit by violating the quota and selling on the open market. Also, Cochrane and Runge, Reforming 
Farm Policy, 4. Cochrane and Runge attested to the “increasingly complex” farm policy.
35 Ibid., 137.
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Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture.”36 The article portrayed a complex and 
nuanced farm policy ripe for exploitation and a popular perception of farmers growing 
fat off the government. Farm Survey respondents concurred with this assessment of 
the complex agricultural policy and had a variety of ideas for solutions. Suggestions 
ranged from better education on economics to increased diversion/soil-bank programs 
to better cooperative and farmer organizations. Several farmers still supported a 
policy that allowed for tighter regulation of production and fair price supports. Others 
felt strongly that the answer could be found in increased foreign trade and new foreign
31markets. Support for a freer, unregulated agricultural policy also was hailed.
Clearly, the issue was one that defied clarity.
When asked what should have been done to assist agriculture in the 1950s and 
1960s, Farm Survey responses showed clear support for policies that would have aided 
small farmers more directly. However, few farmers had concrete conceptions of what 
that assistance should have looked like, nor was there a consistent theme or idea of 
what should have been done. The basis for much of this diverse opinion was a direct 
result of there being little agreement on the root cause of agricultural policy problems. 
Overproduction? Too many farmers? No export market? Low prices? Fixed high 
prices? Embargoes? Because there were such diverse opinions on the nature of the 
problem, there existed equally valid solutions for each of the various issues. Yet, no
36 “A Skilled Grower’s Fat Surplus,” LIFE, 30 (December 7 1959): 136.
37 Answers taken from results of Farm Survey, Question 24 “What do you think could have/should have been done 
during the 1950s and 1960s to assist U.S. agriculture?”
76
overwhelming solution was formulated because not only were farmers split on this
3 8issue, politicians and the administration were as well.
By the end of the Eisenhower administration, public sentiment against the 
agricultural policy was readily apparent. Articles and editorials in such periodicals as 
LIFE, Newsweek, and Farm Journal expressed concern over U.S. farm policies. An 
editorial in Newsweek in 1959 asked, “How insane can our policy get?”39 The same 
author in August of 1960 recorded his suggestion for farm policy as “the best farm 
program would be one to end farm programs.”40 Another editorial in Newsweek 
expressed disbelief regarding maintaining farm income by stating, “No nation can 
guarantee everyone a living where he is, with what he has, forever.”41 Indeed, the 
public outcry against the farm program led to a statement in LIFE magazine in 1959 
that agricultural policy could well be the “thorniest and most important domestic 
issue” of the 1960 presidential campaign.42
But well before 1960, the Eisenhower administration and America more 
generally had been aware of the trials facing agriculture. Indeed, from the end of 
World War II until 1960, agricultural policy had remained at the forefront of domestic 
politics. Yet, agricultural policy did not undergo significant change during that time, 
nor in the five decades since. A com farmer in South Dakota testified that even some 
farmers have been surprised by how long the supports for farmers have gone on by
38 Farm Survey, Question 33, “Describe what you believe caused overproduction and accompanying pressures 
during the 1950s and 1960s the north central United States?”
39 Henry Hazlitt, “Farm Surplus Solution,” Newsweek, 54 (November 30 1959): 88.
40 Henry Hazlitt, “To End Farm Surpluses,” Newsweek, 56 (August 15 1960): 73.
41 Raymond Moley, “Politics and the Farmer,” Newsweek, 56 (August 29 1960): 90.
42 “The Farm Surplus Y ou’re Paying For,” LIFE, 30 (November 1959): 22.
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stating, “We said thirty years ago that this couldn’t continue, that they [the federal 
government] couldn’t continue to do this program, but they have.”43
Farmers and the Cold War
Asking farmers about dependence and specialization was an attempt to 
discover whether these farmers, most in their late 60s or 70s, would connect increased 
specialization directly with the cold war or foreign policy. None of the respondents 
pointed to cold war or foreign policy considerations as driving farmers to increased 
specialization, though most did see surpluses as a weapon in the fight against 
communism.44 Still, they agreed about little else. Farmers’ views are as complex and 
contradictory as they are important in examining both the changes the cold war made 
on their farm operations and the lack of cohesiveness in solving agriculture’s 
problems, in general.
Despite their intimate knowledge of surpluses, farmers were split on exactly 
what the nature of the surplus problem was. Thirty-one percent saw the farm surplus 
as a potential opportunity in the form of aid, and an equal number saw surplus as a 
farm issue to be handled by agricultural policy.45 Twenty percent pointed toward 
political interests having caused the surpluses, and 15% felt that the surplus issue was 
a national problem.46 These answers are reflective of the very splintered nature of 
farmers’ views. Even within the relatively small geographic area of the survey
43 Matzner, interview by author, December 12, 2001, telephone conversation.
44 Farm Survey, Question 7.
45 Farm Survey, Question 10, “After World War II, American agricultural production grew dramatically. By the 
mid 1950s, this growth had created a national issue o f agricultural surpluses. How did you personally view these 
surpluses? Mark all that apply:” Thirty-one percent viewed this as a potential opportunity and a farm issue.
46 Ibid.
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respondents, farmers were split on what the surplus problem meant. The ramifications 
of these fissures ultimately were reflected in the lack of political resolve in any 
particular farm policy solution.
Although farmers differed on what the surplus problem was, a consensus could 
be found on at least one potential solution. Seventy-eight percent of the farmers 
responding felt that, in the 50s and 60s, foreign markets were a “viable outlet 
(solution) for surplus agricultural commodities.”47 This number fell just slightly to 
70% when asked if they still felt that way today.48 Indeed, the belief in foreign 
markets was and remains an entrenched notion of how to deal with surpluses.
However, this fact also points to one of the major contradictions inherent in an export- 
surplus strategy: foreign markets have limited resources to purchase food, and U.S.- 
grown commodities often are too expensive. Thus, in order to sell to these 
underdeveloped countries, farmers depended on U.S. government subsidization 
programs, which created a two-price system: one higher domestic price and another 
lower world price. These export subsidies created dependencies for both the foreign 
nation and the U.S. farmer.
Like their support for export markets, farmers also overwhelmingly supported 
the idea of utilizing surplus goods in initiatives such as Public Law 480 and Food for 
Peace. Eighty-nine percent of farmers supported or strongly supported using
47 Farm Survey, Question 1 la, “Foreign markets have long been presented as an outlet and solution for surplus U.S. 
agricultural production. In 1960. did you believe foreign markets were a viable outlet (solution) for surplus 
agricultural commodities?”
48 Farm Survey, Question 1 lb , “Do you still feel the same?”
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agricultural goods as a developmental tool for the underdeveloped world.49 Yet, 
despite tremendous support for development programs, the farmers surveyed were less 
optimistic that such programs could create meaningful change. When asked if Public 
Law 480 or Food for Peace could alleviate hunger, farmers were split: 52% believed it 
could, 41% believed it could not, and 7% did not have an opinion. Though a thin 
majority believed that such programs could make a meaningful impact on the hungry 
of the world, many also were realistic about the true potential of humanitarian aid.50
When farmers were asked whether they felt surpluses battled communism, 
nearly 80% of responses felt that they did.51 Slightly fewer farmers were inclined to 
see surpluses as weapons or tools in America’s foreign policy. The majority of 
farmers surveyed did see agriculture’s connection to the foreign policy of the United 
States and thereby the battle against communism.52 Obviously, because of the 
mentality of America at the time, much of this patriotic fervor could be the result of 
general anti-communist sentiment. Yet, it is important to note that farmers possibly 
did (and appear to now) view surpluses as active agents in the cold war battle. But 
also of note is the fact that farmers were far less likely to blame the cold war or 
foreign policy for the problems in agriculture, despite acknowledging that agriculture 
played a role in both.
49 Farm Survey, Question 19, “How did you feel about plans for America’s surplus agricultural products to be used 
to assist in developing the 3rd World (such as in the “Food for Peace” program begun in the late 1950s)?” 27 
respondents, 18 supported, 6 strongly supported.
50 Farm Survey, Question 30, “Did you believe that through programs such as Food for Peace or Public Law 480 
the U.S. could alleviate hunger in the world?” 29 respondents, 15 yes, 12 no, 2 no opinion.
51 Farm Survey, Question 16, “Did you view the use o f U.S. surpluses as assisting the United States in battling 
communism?” 28 respondents, 22 yes, 4 no opinion, 2 no.
52 Farm Survey, Question 17, “Did you ever feel that U.S. agriculture was being utilized as a ‘tool’ or ‘weapon’ 
against communism?” 26 respondents, 17 yes, 5 no, 4 no opinion.
53 See page 68, the cold war was not blamed for specialization based on responses to Question 7.
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Further, despite responses acknowledging that surpluses assisted in the battle 
against communism and that agriculture was a weapon against communism, fewer 
farmers were willing to concede their role as cold warriors. When asked whether they 
saw themselves as assisting in the battle against communism, a slim majority replied 
positively (53.6%). Twenty-nine percent held no opinion, while 18% felt they did not 
assist in the battle.54 Although the responses to this question may well be chalked up 
to rural humility, it does denote the disconnect and disinterest of many farmers from 
recognizing their role in the cold war. And ultimately, one out of four farmers who 
saw the role of surpluses in battling communism did not extend that role in ‘combat’ 
to themselves.55
Though a majority of farmers acknowledged the possible role of agriculture in 
the cold war, they did believe that the agricultural surplus problem was a problem to 
be fixed by agricultural policy.56 Despite wanting to help the fight against 
communism, farmers still wanted the economic benefits to which they felt entitled. 
However, their surpluses were more than an agricultural problem; they had become an 
issue of national significance economically and perhaps more of a national issue in 
terms of security and ideology. The boon of U.S. agriculture stood in contrast to the 
ineptness of Soviet agriculture.57 Further, the surpluses of agricultural stocks were a
54 Farm Survey, Question 15, “Did you see yourself as assisting in the battle against communism?” 28 
respondents, 15 yes, 8 no opinion, 5 no.
55 Compiled based on responses to Farm Survey, Questions 15 and 16. The difference between those answering 
affirmatively to Question 15 and those answering affirmatively to Question 16 represented a 25% decrease.
56 Farm Survey, Question 10, “After World War II, American agricultural production grew dramatically. By the 
mid 1950s, this growth had created a national issue of agricultural surpluses. How did you personally view these 
surpluses?
Mark all that apply:” Sixty-three percent saw surpluses as a problem to be handled by agricultural policy.
57 Nikita S. Khrushchev, “In Khrushchev’s Own Words— “Why Russia is in trouble,” U.S. News & World Report, 
(February 25, 1955), 58-60. Khrushchev details the issues in Soviet agriculture, from old equipment to red tape to
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safety net in the event of an actual war or a natural disaster. At the time, these 
surpluses were perceived to be worth the costs of subsidization because they held 
significance to both real and perceived American security.
Farmers held conflicting opinions on just how American foreign policy 
influenced their farming operations. Without a more clear understanding of U.S. 
foreign policy and its subsequent bearing on agricultural policy, farmers often were ill- 
prepared to navigate the diverse ideas and policies floated during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Instead of blaming cold war pressures, farmers attributed the surplus and agriculture 
policy problems to an array of factors. Technology -  in terms of machinery, 
technique, hybrids, fertilizer, herbicide, and pesticide — was frequently given its due as 
a factor in overproduction. The “cost-price squeeze” also was listed, in which farmers 
faced with low prices were forced to maximize production in order to increase volume 
and eventually their margins. Many farmers listed farm programs as a major factor in 
fueling agricultural surplus, as the programs failed to create any meaningful method of 
maintaining income, reducing surpluses, and retaining low food prices for
58consumers.
Despite the prevalence of agricultural technology and policy being held 
culpable for the problems, several farmers listed more sophisticated arguments to the 
surplus question. In particular, 10% of Farm Survey respondents felt strongly that the 
surplus problem was a red herring.59 Instead, they thought the problem was with a
outdated theories. Also “Farm Trouble in Russia,” Farm Journal, 79 (March 1956), 6+. This article blames much 
of the problems in Soviet agriculture on government mismanagement.
58 Analysis based on answers from Farm Survey, Question 33, “Describe what you believe caused overproduction 
and accompanying pressures during the 1950s and 1960s in the North Central United States.”
59 Ibid. Based on 3 o f 29 responses.
82
government unwilling to find a means of distributing food. This belief stemmed from 
the notion that surpluses should not exist in a world in which there were starving and 
hungry people. This argument was expanded by one farmer who stated directly that 
the United States “has and does wage war by withholding food distribution.”60 
Essential to this argument is the idea that the United States used food as a weapon of 
foreign policy. Yet this level of sophistication was not the norm. Instead, farmers, 
like politicians and policy makers, held significantly disparate views on the causes of 
the surplus issue, inhibiting consensus on a solution.
Conclusion
Surpluses have proven to be an enigma. They simultaneously represented the 
bounty of America as well as the limits of American power and will to feed the world. 
Economically, surpluses resulted in stagnated prices and fostered high government 
storage and subsidization costs. And yet, from the perspective of the cold war, they 
enhanced both the real and projected power of the United States. They also were 
viewed with disdain by some nations. Cheap food extended to all aspects of the U.S. 
economy as a benefit -  except to farmers. Surplus foodstuffs cost taxpayers storage 
costs, and lack of means and will to distribute food to the needy worldwide revealed 
the limits of America’s hegemonic power (or possibly the most ignoble nature of U.S. 
power).
The question of overproduction and its associated problems remains difficult to 
understand and even more elusive to resolve. Despite political and policy efforts, the 
existence of surpluses during the 1950s and 1960s lingered. Instead, technology,
60 Farm Survey response to Question 33.
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science, technique, and the will of the farmer converged in a manner that only 
furthered the surplus problems in the 1950s. The cold war then imposed the security 
and ideological fears that elevated food, and thereby farmers, into powerful tools of 
cold war power. In so doing, those same fears and concerns took precedence over a 
concerted effort to truly innovate a solution for agriculture’s woes. Had a foreign 
threat not existed, domestic pressure very well might have created momentum to force 
meaningful change. Instead, like the Depression and World War II eras prior, the cold 
war diverted policy makers and farmers from constructing a solution. As a result, 
instead of a departure from subsidies and quotas, agricultural policy held stubbornly to 
the past. Ultimately, a system was enacted that performs like a bleeder valve, slowly 
releasing excess labor in agriculture while continually rewarding larger, more capital- 
efficient farms.
The farmers surveyed did not view the cold war as a direct influence on their 
farm operations. However, it is difficult to dismiss the role the cold war, and 
subsequently U.S. agriculture, played in the post-World War II world. Whether as 
trade lever or as developmental aid, agricultural production was of significant value. 
Further, surplus agricultural stocks, like their brethren nuclear and military stockpiles, 
were highly symbolic and highly politicized vestiges of U.S. might. Unlike 
accusations of the United States falling behind the Soviets and creating a “missile 
gap,” no one could suggest a similar “food gap” existed.
The symbolism of America’s food bounty and the consequent pride it 
promoted in farmers was emphasized by cold war fears and competition. In not 
understanding and accepting their roles in the cold war, farmers allowed themselves to
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underestimate the entirety of agriculture’s scope and power. Domestic food 
production, foreign aid, trade, and hegemonic symbols were significant enough to 
have allowed U.S. agriculture more fortitude in policy demands. Instead, 
misunderstanding, dissonance, parochialism, and human nature caused friction and 
fissure that severely hindered any populist effort to create a farm policy that did not 
reward overproduction and cutthroat competition amongst farmers.
Without a united voice, the agricultural sector left itself open to influence 
from outside factors. As surpluses mounted and cold war tensions heightened, the 
Eisenhower administration was able to seize American farm bounty as a useful tool of 
foreign policy. Through Public Law 480 legislation, the Eisenhower administration 
manipulated world markets, trade policy, and geopolitics in an effort to strengthen its 
containment policies. Agricultural surpluses proved to be cheap and useful foreign 
aid, even while they carried many negative connotations. Though Public Law 480 did 
little to ease the surplus problem, its foreign policy merits solidified agriculture’s role 
in the cold war.
The fears of communist aggression, world war, and nuclear confrontation 
served as the basis for food power’s importance in the cold war. The bounty of 
American agricultural production projected U.S. power to the world (and the Soviets). 
Despite domestic political and economic costs, agricultural surplus production was 
allowed to continue due in part to the very real value such surpluses held in cold war 
geopolitics. Food as an asset also meant food as power, and in the cold war, 
perceptions of power were invaluable.
+  +  +
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Afterword
There is little doubt that the half-century that has passed since the 1950s has 
witnessed impressive transformations. From tense thermonuclear stand-off to detente 
to disarmament and ultimately to collapse, the cold war seems indisputably an artifact 
of history. Some of the hot spots around the globe that played large and small parts in 
the cold war drama have cooled, while others remain as volatile as ever. And still, 
parts of the underdeveloped world struggle to keep pace and not fall further behind.
Agricultural surplus no longer elicits much press castigation, though 
agricultural policy, more generally, remains a topic frequently mentioned in 
discussions of pork-barrel spending. The technology of farming has continued to 
shift. Now, two-hundred-thousand dollar investments in a single piece of machinery 
are commonplace, while patents on gene modifications mean farmers don’t always 
own the reproductive rights to their own harvests. Production advances and 
government subsidy reliance remain, while new dependence on chemical applications 
has ensnared farmers in costly bonds to chemical-pharmaceutical giants. Thus, much 
like a half-century ago, farmers remain immersed in a capital intensive industry deeply 
bound to an agricultural policy of support and subsidy.
The roots of agricultural surplus and policy dysfunction go back in history 
before the cold war, yet the cold war conflict bound agriculture firmly to the 
addictions of subsidies and price supports. The chief crops of surplus and subsidy in
86
the 1950s, are the same chief crops of subsidy today.1 Without the cold war specter, 
the surplus bounty is as obsolete as nuclear weaponry and long-range bombers. And 
though American agricultural bounty still remains a steady source of U.S. power and 
prestige, subsidized com and soybeans now remain as politicized as ever. Politicians 
tout farm-grown alternatives to our oil dependency such as ethanol and soy bio-diesel. 
While critics link obesity to com syrups.2
Although these new uses for crops mean there is no longer a surplus, they also 
remind that the cold war era policies that fueled the shift toward com and soybean 
production still echo. Despite the absence of cold war stimulus, agricultural policy 
favoring large farmers and particular crops remains in existence. Such realities recall 
the lingering connections to the cold war. No longer a strategic asset combating 
communism, agriculture nevertheless remains inescapably mired in cold war era 
policies that fostered an agricultural industry unchecked by simple supply-demand 
economic constraints.
The future of American agriculture remains to be seen. However, the past is 
clear, government subsidies, large-scale capital investment, specialization, and 
production bounty are indicative of agriculture in the last half of the twentieth-century. 
Agriculture has fueled development and expansion of U.S. power and wealth and, as 
such, remains an integral cog in the American economic machine. As the tastes and 
needs of the world food consumer shift, the agricultural sector may be forced to adjust.
1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Farm Programs: Information on Recipients o f  Federal Payments, (Washington, 
D.C., 2001) 22.
2 Scott Fields, “The Fat o f the Land: Do Agricultural Subsidies Foster Poor FTealth?” Environmental Health 
Perspectives, Vol. 112, No. 14, p. 820-823, 2004.
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Just how the future of American agriculture will be constructed is uncertain, though it 
is clear that in an increasingly globalized society, agriculture, food, and farm income 
will remain relevant.
Appendix
Table 1.1: E conom ic  Military A ss is ta n c e  L oans and  G ra n ts 1
World Region (Country)
Post-War
Relief
Period
1946-48
Marshall 
Plan Period
1949-52
Mutual 
Security 
Act Period
1953-61
Foreign 
Assistance 
Act Period
1962-99
Total Aid 12,963 28,699 43,352 441,416
Middle East & North Africa (Total) 44 185 3,328 138,603
Sub-Saharan Africa (Total) 10 4 462 29,912
Latin America & Caribbean (Total) 98 144 2,083 39,701
Asia (Total) 2,253 4,111 18,948 83,941
Japan 980 1,221 1,188 565
Oceania (Total) 16 8 79 3,839
Eurasia (Total) 186 - - 9,080
Eastern Europe (Total) 930 497 1,538 6,264
Western Europe (Total) 8,300 23,078 13,166 35,286
Canada - 9 22
World (not specified) 1,127 663 3,726 94,789
1 U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants(The Greenbook), 
http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/query_historical.html.
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Table 1.2: U.S. Aid 1946-19652
S£If§i IE lipll X,
tilp iisipllippa§$|§g§|£ l l fp p
mm WJMWH H i i£gj
W orld R eg ion  (Country) 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 '”* 1953 1954 1955
Middle East & North Africa 18.8 23 4 1.4 - 11.8 " 28.5 144.5 151.6 219.9 255.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.2 1.7 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.9 2.4 25.8 30.1 9.7
Latin America & Caribbean 29.6 27.7 40.9 26.2 27.8 17.4 72.8 130.5 67.6 118.0
Asia 321.9 1, 159.0 771.9 1,319.3 682.5 1, 136.5 972.4 1,152.1 1,909.8 2 ,050.5
Japan 106.7 389.3 483.7 501.5 365.3 290.3 63.6 91.9 83.1 214.2
Oceania 4.4 11.0 1.0 2.4 0.8 1.0 4.2 5.1 4.8 4.9
Eurasia 86.2 100.2 - - - - - - - -
Eastern Europe 549.9 379.6 - - - 158.3 338.5 289.2 196.3 215.7
Western Europe 1,303.4 4 ,863.5 2 ,132.8 6 ,755.4 5 , 135.4 6 , 140.4 5 ,046.8 2 ,912.6 2 ,085.9 1, 151.9
Canada - - - - - 2.7 6.0 7.8 4.9 -
World (not specified) 754.3 141.9 230.8 197.2 112.9 126.8 226.3 305.2 248.5 291.3
Total Aid 3 ,075.7 6 ,708.0 3 ,179.5 8 ,300.7 5 ,971.3 7 ,612.5 6 ,813.9 4 ,979.9 4 ,767.8 4 ,097.5
W orld R eg ion  (Country) 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Middle East & North Africa 224.7 347.1 505.7 455.3 516.5 652.1 661.8 661.4 430.1 470.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 12.2 25.8 16.6 75.4 44.7 221.6 328.8 273.7 234.8 219.3
Latin America & Caribbean 253.8 324.6 211.4 227.3 226.4 523.6 995.0 960.9 1,095.1 915.5
Asia 2 ,465.4 2 ,593.3 1,659.0 2 ,204.9 2 ,683.1 2 ,229.5 2 ,856.4 2 ,613.2 2 ,270.7 2 ,408.1
Japan 261.9 178.8 98.7 48.2 143.2 68.3 167.2 48.1 8.1 18.2
Oceania 5.9 4.7 6.0 29.9 9.7 8.1 25.7 43.5 40.9 28.0
Eurasia - - - - - - - - - -
Eastern Europe 125.8 207.7 135.5 185.3 79.9 102.6 122.8 120.1 88.3 91.7
Western Europe 1,381.8 920.3 1,124.4 1,231.2 1,215.2 1, 143.0 855.4 903.2 554.4 530.1
Canada - - - - - 9.1 - - - -
World (not specified) 378.1 447.8 355.9 665.0 442.7 591.4 686.4 808.8 550.8 758.0
Total Aid 4 ,847.7 4 ,871.3 4 ,014.5 5 ,074.3 5 ,218.2 5 ,481.0 6 ,532.3 6 ,384.8 5 ,265.1 5 ,420.7
Table 2.1: Food Aid G ran ts  & L oans 3
2 U.S. Agency for International Develepment, The Greenbook, 
http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/query_historical.html.
3 U.S. Agency for International Develepment, The Greenbook, 
http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/query_historical.html.
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W o r ld  R e g i o n  ( C o u n t r y ) 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 5 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 7 1 9 5 8 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 5
Summary of All Countries 83.2 4.1 69.5 398.5 559.3 622.9 503.1 439 540.9 751.9 847.8 927.4 936 639.2
Middle East & North Africa (Total) 25.5 0 25 31.3 31.6 31.3 33.7 62 3 52.7 239.1 129 217.1 126.3 96.1
Sub-Saharan Africa (Total) 0.1 0 0 0 0.6 0.5 0.3 5.8 4.9 17.8 46.8 47.1 17 22.2
Latin America & Caribbean (Total) 0.1 0 0.9 28.4 24.5 61.4 34.9 27.1 18.3 55.3 76.5 96.5 164.9 85.3
Asia (Total) 3.1 1.4 5.1 84.7 217.4 284.6 188.1 205.6 371.6 314.5 403.5 445.5 498.1 348.7
Oceania (Total) 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.4
Eurasia (Total) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eastern Europe (Total) 24.8 0.2 1.1 114.4 71.3 40 54.5 49.3 21.5 26.7 45.1 24.3 28.4 8.8
Western Europe (Total) 29.6 2.5 37.4 120.1 209.9 158.5 175.8 62.2 60.1 67.2 100.3 49.4 45.1 25.7
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
World (not specified) 0 0 0 19.6 3.9 46.6 15.8 26.7 11.8 31.3 46.5 47.4 56.2, 52
W o r ld  R e g i o n  ( C o u n t r y ) 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 5 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 7 1 9 5 8 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 5
Summary of All Countries 0 0 0 143.4 320.6 539.3 283.2 405.6 434.4 399.2 555 520.7 565.5 723.4
Middle East & North Africa (Total) 0 0 0 10.8 40.8 11.8 34.9 51.4 66.5 79 142.2 109.8 116.6 142.3
Sub-Saharan Africa (Total) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7.6 26.6 19.6
Latin America & Caribbean (Total) 0 0 0 13.8 85 91.2 28.3 6.1 26 90.1 49.9 67.9 121.4 11.2
Asia (Total) 0 0 0 68.2 93.5 237.9 89.3 210.5 276.6 163.5 191.3 208.9 198.4 422.7
Oceania (Total) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eurasia (Total) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eastern Europe (Total) 0 0 0 0 9 84.1 40 66.6 13.5 19.3 75.4 95.5 59 82.9
Western Europe (Total) 0 0 0 50.6 92.3 114.3 90.7 71 51.8 47.3 89.2 31 43.5 44.7
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
World (not specified) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2.2: Public Law 480 Aid4
W o r ld  R e g i o n  ( C o u n t r y ) 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 5 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 7 1 9 5 8 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 5
Summary of All Countries 0 0 0 237.1 476.4 777.7 404.1 557 740.7 673.4 973.4 888 932.4 945
Middle East & North Africa (Total) 0 0 0 10.8 46.7 11.8 34.9 62.9 71.8 106.2 160.4 114.2 121 146.7
Sub-Saharan Africa (Total) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18.7 35.5 27.5 24.4
Latin America & Caribbean (Total) 0 0 0 13.8 85 126.8 28.3 6.1 26.1 117.1 63.9 76.6 150.2 11.2
Asia (Total) 0 0 0 91.1 180 367.8 174.3 332.1 583.1 369.7 515.2 528.4 526.2 634.6
Oceania (Total) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eurasia (Total) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eastern Europe (Total) 0 0 0 47.5 68.4 84.1 65.2 85.4 17.3 26.9 98.7 97.5 59 82.9
Western Europe (Total) 0 0 0 71 92.4 163.7 107.9 73.6 63.2 53.5 116.5 35.8 48.5 45.2
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
World (not specified) 0 0 0 2.9 3.9 23.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i
W o r ld  R e g i o n  ( C o u n t r y ) 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 5 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 7 1 9 5 8 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 5
Summary of All Countries 83.2 4.1 69.5 304.8 403.5 384.5 382.2 287.6 234.6 477.7 429.4 560.1 569.1 417.6
Middle East & North Africa (Total) 25.5 0 25 31.3 25.7 31.3 33.7 50.8 47.4 211.9 110.8 212.7 121.9 91.7
Sub-Saharan Africa (Total) 0.1 0 0 0 0.6 0.5 0.3 5.8 4.9 17.8 35.1 19.2 16.1 17.4
Latin America & Caribbean (Total) 0.1 0 0.9 28.4 24 5 25.8 34.9 27.1 18.2 28.3 62.5 87.8 136.1 85.3
^sia (Total) 3.1 1.4 5.1 61.8 130.9 154.7 103.1 84 65.1 108.3 79.6 126 170.3 136.8
Oceania (Total) 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.4
Eurasia (Total) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eastern Europe (Total) 24.8 0.2 1.1 66.9 11.9 40 29.3 30.5 17.7 19.1 21.8 22.3 28.4 8.8
/Vestem Europe (Total) 29.6 2.5 37.4 99.7 209.8 109.1 158.6 59.6 48.7 61 73 44.6 40.1 25.2
Oanada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
/Vorld (not specified) 0 0 0 16.7 0 23.1 22.3 29.8 32.6 31.3 46.5 47.4 56.2 52
4 U.S. Agency for International Develepment, The Greenbook, 
http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/query_historical.html.
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Table 3.1: W heat and  Corn Carry-over S to ck s  1938-19645
Total Old Crop Carry-over j
Year W heat Corn
1938 153,107 361,438
1939 250,015 583,740
1940 279,720 687,623
1941 384,916 644,970
1942 632,103 496,880
1943 621,659 384,101
1944 316,575 230,995
1945 279,180 315,272
1946 100,086 171,820
1947 83,837 283,218
1948 195,943 123,473
1949 307,285 813,012
1950 424,714 844,980
1951 396,234 739,247
1952 255,670 486,377
1953 562,486 768,790
1954 933,506 919,681
1955 1,036,178 1,034,823
1956 1,033,487 1,164,823
1957 908,830 1,418,904
1958 881,373 1,469,344
1959 1,295,066 1,524,131
1960 1,313,518 1,786,966
1961 1,411,178 2,008,357
1962 1,321,870 1,639,546
1963 1,194,933 1,345,893
1964 901,193 1,510,148
5 USDA, Agricultural Statistics, U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.C. 1938-1965). 
Taken from various years from the detail tables for Wheat and Corn Carryover Stocks.
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Table 3 .2 : U.S. N um ber of All Farm W orkers and  Value of 
Agricultural S e c to r  P ro d u c tio n 6
1920 13,432,000 516,632,000
1925 13,036,000 $14,081,000
1930 12,497,000 $11,201,000
1935 12,733,000 $9,821,000
1940 10,979,000 $10,617,000
1945 10,000,000 $24,632,000
1950 9,926,000 $32,805,532
1955 8,381,000 $33,219,217
1960 7,057,000 $37,885,588
1965 5,610,000 $44,086,022
1970 4,523,000 $55,100,751
6 From http://www.usda.gov/nass/graphics/data/fl_fnnwk.txt & 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FarmIncome/finfidmu.htm
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Table 3.3: Total Farm M ortgage Debt 1949-1965
Farm M ortgage Debt:
Am ount of outstanding loans reported by principal lenders, 
other debt, and total debt, United States, Jan. 1, 1949-65
1949 5,288,331 —
1950 5,579,278 5.5%
1951 6,112,286 9.6%
1952 6,662,327 9.0%
1953 7,240,937 8.7%
1954 7,739,931 6.9%
1955 8,245,278 6.5%
1956 9,012,016 9.3%
1957 9,821,525 9.0%
1958 10,382,475 5.7%
1959 11,091,390 6.8%
1960 12,082,409 8.9%
1961 12,820,304 6.1%
1962 13,899,105 8.4%
1963 15,167,821 9.1%
1964 16,803,505 10.8%
1965 18,904,480 12.5%
15-Year Change 13,616,149 257.5%
Source: USDA, Agricultural S ta tis tics , 1965, Table 716, p. 503
Next five pages: Survey
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Farm Survey, Conducted November and December of 2002.
The criteria for the survey involved finding respondents who had farmed 
during the 1950s and/or 1960s independently or with a relative in Iowa, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, and South Dakota. Thirty-three questions were posed, consisting of short 
answer, yes/no, and multiple-choice questions. Some questions also provided room 
for optional comments. The sampling centered on four geographic areas solidly 
within the north-central Com Belt (See Appendix figures 1.1 below). The survey was 
not necessarily conducted in a strident scientific manner, but an attempt was made to 
compile a sampling of farmers’ views on agricultural policy, foreign policy, and their 
memories of the cold war. As such, it did provide an interesting insight into this time 
frame in U.S. history.
F ig u r e  3 .7 : R e s p o n d e n ts  b y  S ta te
M N , 9 ,  3 1 %
S D ,  1 1 , 3 8 %
N E ,  1 ,  3 %
IA, 8 ,  2 8 %
Figure 1.1: Respondents by State
Forty farmers in four states received surveys, of which 29 responses were 
returned (72.5%). The pie chart above presents the statistical breakdown of these 
surveys. Per the nature of this study, these farmers were primarily com and cattle 
farmers. Of the respondents, 97% raised both com and cattle in 1960, while by 1985
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those numbers fell to 86% still raising com and 76% still raising cattle.7 Overall, 
livestock production fell markedly between the 1960s and 1980s. Forty-one percent 
fewer farmers raised hogs and 55% fewer farmers raised poultry. Likewise, in nearly 
every crop and livestock category, there were dramatic declines. The one exception 
was soybean production, in which there was a 14% increase.
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
P e r c e n ta g e  of  R e s p o n d e n t s  P lanting  C ro p s  1955 
c o m p a r e d  to  2001
□  1955 2001
C orn  S o y b e a n s  W h e a t  S o r g h u m O a t s B a r le y A lfa lfa
Figure 1.2: Percentage of Respondents Planting Crops 1955 Compared to 2001, Farm 
Survey. Dramatic decreases in Sorghum, Oats, Barley, and Alfalfa, while increases in 
Soybeans and Wheat, epitomize the shift to principle crops Corn, Soybeans, and Wheat.
Find on the following pages the format of the survey mailed to the selection of
farmers.
7 Research Survey, Question 2, “In which state(s) have you farmed? Check all that apply.” See Survey in 
Appendix.
8 From Farm Survey, Questions 4 and 6, “What livestock and/or crops did you produce between 1955-1960?” and 
“What livestock and/or crops did you produce during the past 5 years (or the 5 years prior to retirement)?” In 1960, 
21% of the farmers surveyed raised sorghum, but none raised sorghum in their last five years o f farming. 
Additionally, during those last five years, 44 percent fewer fanners raised oats, 28% fewer raised barely, and more 
than one quarter fewer raised alfalfa.
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Thanks for partaking in this survey. The information collected will remain private and anonymous.
The first set of questions are about your general farming/agribusiness experience. The latter questions 
are more specific. Please answer each question as honestly and accurately as you can recollect. Feel 
free to answer as little or as much as you wish. Also, feel free to skip questions you feel are not 
applicable or you do not wish to answer.
If you are/were involved in agriculture or rural business but did not farm directly, check here □  and skip 
to question #8 on page 2. If you are/were a farmer, begin with questions #1-7, then skip to question #11
Farm ing B ackground
1. Approximately what year did you begin farming? (If you began farming with a family
member or as a youth, estimate the year you began as a full-time farm laborer.)_______
2. In which state(s) have you farmed? Check all that apply.
□  IA □  NE □  SD □  MN □  ND □  WI O ther(s)___________
3. Approximately how many acres did you farm in 1960? (Include both tilled and pasture 
land.)
□  0-100 □  100-300 □  300-500 □  500-700 □  700-1000 ^  1000 +
4. What livestock and/or crops did you produce between 1955-1960?
Livestock
1 1 cattle O  poultry 1 1 com 1 1 oats
1 1 hogs Q  other(s) 1 1 soybeans 1 1 barley
1 1 sheep 1 1 wheat 1 1 alfalfa
1 1 sorghum
1 1 other(s)
Approximately how many acres did you farm in 1985? (Include both tilled and pasture
land.)
□  0-100 □  100-300 □  300-500 □  500-700 □  700-1000
□+ooo□
What livestock and/or crops did you produce during the past 5 years (or the 5 years prior
to retirement)?
Livestock Crops
1 1 cattle Q  poultry 1 1 corn 1 1 oats
H hogs n  other(s) 1 1 soybeans 1 1 barley
1 1 sheep 1 1 wheat 1 1 alfalfa
1 1 sorghum
I I other(s)
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7. Do you think farmers have become more dependent on fewer crops or livestock in the last 
half-century?
I I Yes HH No
Explain:
If you have answered questions #1-7, please skip to #10
A g rib u s in e s s  b ac k g ro u n d  (for non-farm ers)
8. a) In approximately what year did you begin in agribusiness / a rural business enterprise?
b) In what area(s) were you primarily involved? Check all that apply:
I I Grain I I Insurance O  Seed Q  Equipment sales
I I O ther______________
9. In which state(s) were you involved in agribusiness? Check all that apply.
□  IA □  NE □  SD □  MN □  ND □  WI □  O ther(s)__
The S u rp lu s  Issu e
10. After World War II, American agricultural production grew dramatically. By the mid 
1950s, this growth had created a national issue of agricultural surpluses. How did you 
personally view these surpluses?
Check all that apply:
I I Potential opportunity to assist those in need
I I National problem that required national attention
I I Farm issue that should be handled by agricultural policy
I I Political issue caused and worsened by competing political interests
I I None o f the above
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11. a) Foreign markets have long been presented as an outlet and solution for surplus U.S. 
agricultural production. In 1960, did you believe foreign markets were a viable outlet 
(solution) for surplus agricultural commodities?
EH Yes EH No EH No opinion
b) Do you still feel the same?
I I Yes EH No I I No opinion
Cold W ar Farm ing
12. During the 1950s and 1960s, the United States became engaged in a conflict with the 
Soviet Union, generally referred to as the “cold war.” How do you remember it affecting 
you, your family, and your work? (Ifyou need additional room, write on the back o f  this 
paper.)
13. Did you support U.S. foreign policy regarding the USSR and China?
□  Yes □  No I I No opinion
14. Were you ever fearful o f the USSR or China out-producing American agriculture?
□  Yes I I No EH No opinion
15. Did you see yourself as assisting in the battle against communism?
□  Yes □  No I I No opinion
16. Did you view the use o f U.S. surpluses as assisting the United States in battling 
communism?
□  Yes □  No I I No opinion
17. Did you ever feel that U.S. agriculture was being utilized as ‘tool’ or ‘weapon’ against 
communism?
□  Yes I I No EH No opinion
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18. Did you think the cold war diverted interest, money, and support from the plight of 
farmers and rural America?
□  Yes □  No I I No opinion
19. How did you feel about plans for America’s surplus agricultural products to be used to 
assist in developing the 3rd World (such as in the “Food for Peace” program begun in the 
late 1950s)?
I I Strongly supported □  Supported □  Did not support □  No opinion
Revolving Ag Policy
20. a) Did you favor any o f the following U.S. agricultural policies? Check all that apply (or 
leave blank):
I I Free market/No support □  Rigid price supports
I I Flexible price supports □  Production quotas
I I Marketing quotas □  Emergency supports only
b) If  you were a farmer, did your views differ depending on what crops or livestock you 
produced?
□  Yes □  No □  Indifferent
21. Do you think that too often the label ‘farmers’ was generalized nationally, and not 
specified by region and crop...thereby causing ineffective legislation enacted by 
Congress between 1950-1970?
□  Yes □  No □  Indifferent
22. a) In 1960, did you see yourself or farmers in general more as laborers or as 
businessmen?
I I Laborers □  Businessmen
b) Do you still hold this same view?
□  Yes □  No
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23. Did you or did you know of individuals in the 1950s or 1960s who circumvented 
marketing quotas, acreage allotments, or some other production control set by the USD A?
□  Yes □  No n  Do not remember
24. What do you think could have/should have been done during the 1950s and 1960s to 
assist U.S. agriculture?
Agricultural P re s s u re s
25. a) Thinking back to the 1950s and 1960s, do you recall seeing large agricultural 
businesses (such as International Harvestor, John Deere, Cargill) and the USD A 
promoting products and technology aimed at increasing power, efficiency, and yields?
I I Yes I I No □  No opinion
b) At the time, did you view these marketing campaigns as contradicting the surplus 
production issues facing the United States?
□  Yes I I No □  No opinion
26. Did you see agricultural policy as forcing farmers to compete against each other?
□  Yes □  No □  No opinion
27. a) What agricultural-related organizations did you belong to in 1960? Check all that 
apply:
I I Farm Bureau □  Farmer’s Union
I I Grange □  National Farmer’s Organization
I I O ther____________________  □  None
b) If  so, what were the primary reasons you belonged? Check all that apply:
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□ P o lic ies  I [insurance ^ P r ic e  discounts
O Socia l outings I [Magazines
□ O th e r __________________
c) If  so, how often did you support the organization^’) policies?
I I Always □  Sometimes □  Never
28. Do you agree with the statement: “U.S. agricultural policy essentially has created a 
support system farmers have become dependent upon for survival.”
I I Agree □  Disagree □  Neither agree nor disagree
29. In your opinion, which o f the following factors is most to blame for the problems in U.S. 
agriculture during the 1950s and 1960s? Check no more than two:
I I Politics □  Cold war pressures
I I Overzealous farmers □  Unsound agricultural policy
I I Revolutionary agricultural technology I I O ther____________________
30. Did you believe that through programs such as F oodfor Peace or Public Law 480 the 
U.S. could alleviate hunger in the world?
□  Yes □  No □  No Opinion
31. Did you see the USSR or other countries behind the “Iron Curtain” as potential markets 
that were not adequately investigated during the 1950s and 1960s?
□  Yes □  No □  No Opinion
32. During the late 1950s, some studies suggested that there were just too many farmers and 
not enough customers for their goods. At that time, did you agree with this assessment?
□  Yes □  No □  Do not remember
33. Describe what you believe caused overproduction and accompanying pressures during the 
1950s and 1960s the North Central United States:
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Survey  R esu lts
State Respondents Farm Size (In Acres) Respondents
IA 8 100-300 16
MN 9 300-500 6
NE 1 500-700 3
SD 11 700-1000 1
1000 + 2
Respondents %
24 83%
Farm Size Respondents
100-300 3
300-500 3
500-700 4
700-1000 7
1000 + 6
Past 5 Yrs/5 years
1955-1960 % prior to retirement %
Cattle 28 97% 22 76%
Hogs 27 93% 15 52%
Sheep 3 10% 2 7%
Poultry 18 62% 2 7%
Past 5 Yrs/5 years
1955-1960 % prior to retirement %
Corn 28 97% 25 86%
Soybeans 18 62% 22 76%
Wheat 4 14% 5 17%
Sorghum 6 21% 0 0%
Oats 27 93% 14 48%
Barley 8 28% 0 0%
Alfalfa 26 90% 18 62%
ijjjjjiiijmimsfl
Respondents %
Potential Opportunity 17 63%
National Problem 8 30%
Farm Issue Only 17 63%
Political Problem 11 41%
None of these 1 4%
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Respondents %
No 4 15%
No Opinion 2 7%
Y es 21 78%
Respondents %
No 8 30%
Yes 19 70%
Respondents % Respondents %
No 3 11% No 25 86%
No opinion 10 37% No opinion 1 3%
Yes 14 52% Yes 3 10%
Total 27 Total 29
Respondents % Respondents %
No 5 18% No 2 1%
No opinion 8 29% No opinion 4 14%
Yes 15 54% Yes 22 79%
Total 28 Total 28
Respondents % Respondents %
No 5 19% No 10 37%
No opinion 4 15% No opinion 5 19%
Y es 17 65% Y es 12 44%
Total 26 Total 27
Question 19
Respondents %
Did Not Support 1 4%
No Opinion 2 7%
Strongly Supported 6 22%
Supported 18 67%
Total 27
Question 21
Respondents %
Indifferent 5 19%
No 1 4%
Yes 20 77%
Total 26
Respondents %
Businessmen 15 52%
Laborers 14 48%
Total 29
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Respondents %
No 14 48%
Yes 15 52%
Total 29
Respondents %
No 6 22%
Yes 21 78%
Total 27
Question 23
Respondents %
Don’t Remember 10 40%
No 5 20%
Yes 10 40%
Total 25
Respondents %
No 9 32%
No Opinion 5 18%
Yes 14 50%
Total 28
Question 26
Respondents %
No 7 24%
No Opinion 1 3%
Yes 21 72%
Total 29
Question 28
Respondents %
Agree 25 86%
Disagree 1 3%
Neither 3 10%
Total 29
Respondents %
No 12 41%
No Opinion 2 7%
Yes 15 52%
Total 29
■'% : : 
: ; ;  ^ ' '  ,h;  ^ : Respondents %
No 3 11%
No Opinion 6 22%
Yes 18 67%
Total 27
Question 32
Respondents %
Don’t Remember 6 21%
No 20 71%
Yes 2 7%
Total 28
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